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Over the past several years, the Ethiopian government has committed a substantial portion of the public 
budget to expanding public services and infrastructure in rural areas. This paper assesses who exactly is 
benefiting from this public spending. To do so, this paper undertakes a public expenditure benefit 
incidence analysis across gender and wealth groups of three public services/programs in rural Ethiopia: 
(1) selected components of the Food Security Program (FSP), (2) drinking water supply, and (3) 
agricultural extension services. The analysis uses data at the individual, household, kebele (a subdistrict 
administrative unit), and district level in Ethiopia. The literature on the benefit incidence of services in 
developing countries exclusively focuses on the education and health sectors, whereas its application to 
agricultural and other rural services is nearly wholly absent—a gap that this paper seeks to begin to fill. 
For the selected components of the FSP, the paper finds the average incidence of participation to be pro-
poor, both in concentration curve analysis and quantile-based public spending incidence. However, 
examination of the value of cash and in-kind receipts from the programs finds the cash/food-for-work 
program to be progressive, whereas the direct support (unconditional transfers to households) tends to be 
nonprogressive. The incidence of water services is assessed using different measures of access: physical 
proximity to drinking water sources and the use of improved drinking water sources. Access, as proxied 
by physical proximity, is poverty neutral, whereas the use of improved water facilities is pro-poor. With 
regard to agricultural extension, concentration curve analysis finds the service to be relatively 
progressive, whereas the benefits-to-population ratio demonstrates a somewhat more differentiated 
picture, with nonprogressive features at both ends of the wealth spectrum. From a gender perspective, the 
incidence of agricultural extension is pronouncedly skewed in favor of men. The public works component 
of the FSP favors male-headed households, and the direct support component favors female-headed 
households. In the case of drinking water services, the incidence of safe water use is actually higher for 
female-headed households, raising considerations of how male and female heads may differentially 
prioritize safe water for consumption. As a complement to the benefit incidence analysis, regression 
results identify demand- and supply-side factors that are correlated with access to the three different 
services. 
Keywords:  benefit incidence analysis, Ethiopia, Food Security Program, water facilities, and 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several years, the Ethiopian government has committed substantial resources from the public 
budget to expanding public services and infrastructure in rural areas. There are several important 
dimensions along which it is important to evaluate these public investments, such as the efficiency gains 
from the public resource allocation or the impact that these services and other interventions have had on 
households’ well-being. This paper asks a more first-order question: To what extent do different social 
and economic groups in rural areas tend to access these investments and services?  
This policy question is of course directly relevant to public interventions that seek to target 
particular social and economic groups. In such a context, the benefit incidence of public expenditures on 
these programs speaks directly to the intentions underlying the design in resource allocation for such 
programs. An example of a targeted program, which will be one of the foci of this paper, is Ethiopia’s 
Food Security Program (FSP), a food/cash-for-work intervention that is the second largest program of its 
kind in Africa. 
However, the question of how the benefits from the provision of other, not overtly targeted, 
public services are distributed between women and men, or between different wealth groups, remains 
important and provides information on the equity dimension of public resource allocation. This is 
especially true for interventions that have been a key element of the government’s rural development 
strategy, such as agricultural extension, which has seen a big-push-like expansion in the rural areas of the 
country. Thus, we analyze the benefit incidence of this public service as well a third type of service 
examined in this paper is drinking water supply. This examination is motivated by the high priority that 
households themselves place on drinking water: studies across developing countries, including in Ethiopia 
(see, for example, IFPRI-WB 2010), have repeatedly found that rural households identify the quantity and 
quality of drinking water as the most pressing problem relative to other public services. 
The literature undertaking benefit incidence analysis of public services in developing countries, to 
examine which socioeconomic groups tend to benefit from public spending and public subsidies of 
services, has nearly exclusively focused on the benefit incidence in the education and health sectors. This 
includes, for example, benefit incidence studies of education in Peru (Younger 2003); of health spending 
in South Africa (Castro-Leal 1999), Indonesia (van de Walle 1994), and Africa (Castro-Leal et al. 2000), 
and of both health and education in Madagascar (Glick and Razakamanantsoa 2006, 2002), Indonesia 
(Lanjouw et al. 2001), and Africa (Castro-Leal et al. 1999). Exceptions to this sole focus on health and 
education include analyses of the benefit incidence of public employment schemes and antipoverty 
programs in India, Indonesia, and Argentina (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999b; Sumarto, Suryahadi, and 
Pritchett 2003; Jalan and Ravallion 2003, respectively), and of infrastructure such as water and sanitation, 
electricity, and telecommunication in Bolivia (Ajwad and Wodon 2007). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no incidence analysis has been undertaken on agricultural services such as agricultural 
extension. From the perspective of the literature, this study also adds value by looking at sectors 
heretofore examined little to not at all in terms of their benefit incidence. 
As will be apparent from the discussion, the three programs and services of interest in this 
paper—the FSP, drinking water supply, and agricultural extension—interlink in various ways. First, the 
FSP and the provision of drinking water supply interlink through the public works created in FSP’s 
cash/food-for-work scheme, for which recipients provide their labor. These public works include drinking 
water facilities, such as constructed ponds and hand-dug wells. Furthermore, the component of the FSP 
(aside from the just-mentioned cash/food-for-work smaller-scale community assets) through which 
medium-scale infrastructure is constructed by the government also entails the construction of water 
facilities. Finally, the FSP’s resettlement program included plans to provide resettled households with a 
range of basic services in their new areas, including water supply (FSCB 2004).
1
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The FSP and agricultural extension also interlink in two important ways. First, development 
agents (DAs), whose primary task is agricultural extension, reallocated their time with the onset of the 
FSP, as they became involved in various aspects of FSP, including the Productive Safety Net Program 
(PSNP) implementation (see, for example, Brown and Teshome 2007; Segers et al. 2008). This includes 
collecting information on households’ assets, income sources and incomes, and so on—that is, data 
needed both for identifying FSP-eligible households and for monitoring the outcomes of program 
participation. DAs are also tasked with compiling regular reports on key program elements—for example, 
the number and type of public works constructed and the number and types of beneficiaries (Devereux et 
al. 2008). They are also instrumental in the decisionmaking process in regard to PSNP public works, such 
as site selection for the works (Nigussa and Mberengwa 2009). Second, agricultural extension delivery 
itself is also an element of the FSP household input package. 
The next three sections of the paper provide an overview, as well as a literature review, of these 
three services and interventions. Section 2 reviews Ethiopia’s agricultural extension service; Section 3 
reviews the country’s FSPs, including productive safety nets, Other Food Security Programs, and 
resettlement programs; and Section 4 covers drinking water, inclusive of access, quantity, and quality. 
Section 5 describes the data used and the benefit incidence methodology employed in this study. Sections 
6 through 8 provide the findings on the incidence of public spending on, and access to, agricultural 
extension, the FSP, and the drinking water supply, respectively. Section 9 examines the factors correlated 
with access to services through regression analysis. The final section concludes and summarizes the 
findings of the paper.  
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2.  OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN 
ETHIOPIA
2
An enhanced agricultural extension service is essential to improve outcomes related to development and 
poverty reduction. Although there has been strong political determination to expand public investment in 
agricultural extension in Ethiopia, its impact on farmers’ capacity and adoption of improved technologies 
and practices, and ultimately on agricultural production and incomes, depends on both the quantity and 
the quality of service provided. 
 
Extension programs in Ethiopia are designed at the federal level and implemented by regional and 
local authorities. The government adopted its Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI) 
policy in 1993 (MoPED 1993)
. According to this policy, the government disseminates agricultural 
packages to farmers through the Wereda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development (WoARD) 
(Gebremedhin, Hoekstra, and Tegegne 2006). The national policy of decentralization has promoted rapid 
expansion of the extension service to the kebeles (a kebele is a collection of villages and is an 
administrative unit below the wereda, or district). 
As of 2009, approximately 45,800 DAs were serving in Ethiopia (MoARD 2009a, cited in Davis, 
Swanson, and Amudavi 2009; see Table 1), after a very rapid growth in the number of DAs, from 2,500 
in 1995 and 15,000 in 2002. With an adult agricultural population of 21.8 million, the farmer-to-DA ratio 
is thus 476, reflecting among the highest number of extension agents per agricultural population in the 
developing world. 
Table 1. Number of development agents 
Region  Number  Percentage 
Afar  748  1.6 
Amhara  10,196  22.3 
Beneshangul-Gumuz  677  1.5 
Dire Dawa  88  0.2 
Harari  52  0.1 
Oromia  19,654  42.9 
SNNP  11,061  24.1 
Somali  1,269  2.8 
Tigray  2,067  4.5 
Total  45,812  100 
Source: Davis, Swanson, and Amudavi 2009.  
Note: SNNP = Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. 
DAs graduate by earning a three-year diploma in an agricultural, technical, vocational, and 
education training (ATVET) colleges, of which there are 25 in Ethiopia. Between 8,000 and 14,000 
graduate DAs have emerged annually from these colleges in the past few years, and as of 2008 a 
cumulative total of 60,000 DAs have gone through the training system. 
The government aims to place three DAs in each rural kebele, with a technical specialization in 
crop production, livestock, and natural resource management, respectively. In some kebeles there are 
additional DAs with other specializations, such as beekeeping or cooperative development. These DAs 
are often responsible for providing extension support in more than one kebele. Subject matter specialists 
                                                       
2 This section will limit itself to a brief overview of the literature on agricultural extension in Ethiopia. For a more extensive 
discussion of the topic, Abate (2007) presents the history of extension in Ethiopia, and a recent in-depth description and analysis 
of the Ethiopian agricultural extension system of more recent years is offered in EEA/EEPRI 2006 and in Davis, Swanson, and 
Amudavi 2009.  
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(SMSs) and supervisors are based at the wereda level and higher levels, and they are assigned by 
agroecological areas. The wereda-level SMSs are tasked with providing technical backstopping for the 
DAs, but in many cases they also de facto supervise the DAs. Supervisors, located at the wereda level, 
supervise the work of DAs and are assigned at a ratio of approximately 1 supervisor for 10 DAs (Abate 
2007). 
An agricultural public expenditure review published in 2008 showed that in the most recent year 
for which data were available (2005/06), 517 million birr (in nominal terms) were spent by the 
government on agricultural extension and technical, vocational, and education training (TVET), half of 
which is accounted for by expenditures incurred by regional governments (World Bank 2008).
3
Table 2. Public expenditures on agricultural extension and technical and vocational education and 
training 
 Table 2 
shows no pronounced trend in extension and training spending from 1997 to 2005, with expenditures 
fluctuating within a band of about 200 million and 600 million birr in real terms. As explained above, the 
most rapid growth in DA deployment to kebeles took place in later years, with the total number of DAs on 
duty tripling from 2002 to 2008. The share of regional expenditures on extension and training 
dramatically fluctuated from year to year, for example, with a big fall in the share from 1997 to 1998 and 
a large rise from 2003 to 2004, followed by a rapid fall again. 
4 
  1997/98  1998/99  1999/00  2000/01  2002/02  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06 
Federal + regional expenditures (real million birr, base year = 1997/98) 
Recurrent  30  44  51  61  75  137  206  213  188 
Wages  7  10  12  12  26  94  152  156  131 
O&M  24  34  39  50  50  44  55  57  56 
Capital  186  536  416  298  159  342  392  53  172 
Treasury  123  100  61  74  139  295  371  53  109 
Foreign  62  437  355  224  20  47  21  1  62 
Total  216  580  467  359  234  479  598  266  359 
Regional share (percentage) 
Recurrent  73.3  56.8  39.2  45.9  38.7  82.5  87.9  92.0  90.4 
Wages  28.6  20.0  33.3  33.3  26.9  86.2  91.4  91.7  89.3 
O&M  83.3  67.6  43.6  48.0  44.0  72.7  76.4  93.0  94.6 
Capital  61.3  22.6  17.5  18.1  25.8  14.6  21.4  100.0  4.7 
Treasury  87.0  89.0  77.0  67.6  25.9  9.8  21.6  100.0  7.3 
Foreign  11.3  7.3  7.3  1.8  20.0  44.7  23.8  100.0  0.0 
Total  63.0  25.2  19.9  22.8  29.5  34.0  44.3  94.0  49.6 
Source: World Bank 2008. 
Note: O&M = operations and maintenance. 
A high level of supply, however, does not necessarily imply effective utilization of the service. 
Due to the top-down approach of the service provision, extension agents enforce the promotion of fixed-
technology packages rather than responding to farmers’ demands (IFPRI-WB 2010; Davis, Swanson, and 
Amudavi 2009; Abate 2009). Alene and Hassan (2005) illustrate the inefficiencies due to inappropriate 
technologies with the example of the hybrid maize production observed in the eastern region, where food 
production gains from improved agricultural technologies were not realized mainly because of the 
disequilibrium created by continuous changes in technology and economic conditions. Other examples 
are also given on the absence of variation in the extension system across agroecological zones (Alene and 
Hassan 2008; Spielman, Alemu, and Kelemework 2010). Efa, Gorman, and Phelan (2005) argue that the 
relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of agricultural research have been proved when its design 
                                                       
3 Unfortunately, the report does not provide data distinguishing agricultural extension and TVET expenditures. 
4 The US$/Ethiopian birr average exchange rate in 1997 was US$1 to 6.5 Ethiopian birr, and in 2006 it was US$1 to 9.02 
Ethiopian birr.  
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takes into consideration farmers’ indigenous knowledge. Buchy and Basaznew (2005), however, report 
that there is little effort to associate new agricultural research and development with farmers’ knowledge 
or to learn what kinds of services farmers would like to receive. A limitation also lies in a lack of practical 
(as opposed to theoretical) skills on the part of DAs, limiting their ability to effectively serve farmers 
(Davis, Swanson, and Amudavi 2009). 
One of the ways in which extension advice reaches farms is through model farmers: extension 
agents work closely and directly with model farmers, who are then supposed to pass extension messages 
on to “follower” farmers. Lemma (2007) reports that the selection of these model farmers is often cited as 
being based not solely on farming skills but also on social capital as well as other considerations pointing 
to favoritism, which may compromise the usefulness of this extension modality. 
Alternative providers play a limited role in the provision of extension services. Farmer 
cooperatives, although not directly active in offering extension services, were reported to be successful in 
projects that encourage farmers to engage in activities such as dairy farming and beehive production 
(IFPRI-WB 2010). Cooperatives are also a major source of both agricultural inputs and credit, which are 
found as major supply-side constraints to fertilizer adoption (Davis, Swanson, and Amudavi 2009; 
Croppenstedt, Demeke, and Meschi 2003). However, local farmers reported that cooperatives are closely 
tied into the standard package approach to extension, and although supposedly farmer-driven 
organizations, they are not free to set their own agendas based on member needs. Instead, the government 
sets the parameters within which cooperative programs operate (IFPRI-WB 2010). Bernard, Gabre-
Madhin, and Teffesse (2007) found that cooperatives are more likely to be found in weredas that already 
have better access to markets and lower exposure to price and environmental risks. DSA (2006) attributes 
a weak agricultural input sector to the absence of integration of the private sector, cooperatives, and 
farmers with microfinance institutions
  
Other actors in agricultural extension services are the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
which generally provide training to extension agents and other wereda-level civil servants on, for 
example, gender issues in development and community development. Although a strong record of 
training broad groups of DAs has been recorded (Davis, Swanson, and Amudavi 2009), there are 
challenges in the collaboration and coordination between interventions of NGOs and those of the wereda 
government.  
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3.  BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ETHIOPIAN FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM 
Ethiopia’s FSP is a large-scale intervention aimed at mitigating food insecurity in the country by 
providing food, cash, assets, and agricultural inputs to chronically food-insecure households, in part free 
and in part in compensation for individuals’ labor provision for constructing community infrastructure 
and agricultural projects. Some medium-scale public works are also directly financed by the FSP. In 
addition, the program resettles food-insecure households in some areas with very low agricultural 
potential to more fertile locations. At the time when the FSP was being initiated, the government 
estimated that the problem of food security, having become one of the key features of rural poverty, had 
grown to a scale in which approximately 14 million people had been in need of emergency food aid in the 
early years of the first decade of the 2000s (MoARD 2004). Initially, 262 weredas were identified as 
eligible for receiving FSP benefits. 
This section provides a (very short) overview of the FSP and its components—the PSNP, the 
Other Food Security Programss (OFSP) (some components of the latter recently renamed the Household 
Asset Building Program), and the resettlement program—and summarizes findings on the FSP’s 
performance and impact by reviewing the pertinent literature. For more in-depth discussion of the 
components of the FSP, please refer to the cited studies. 
Productive Safety Net Program  
The PSNP consists of transfers to households in the form of food or cash (or some combination of food 
and cash). Households may receive transfers for which a household member has to provide labor for 
community infrastructure creation, or if there is no able-bodied household member, the household eligible 
for PSNP receives free transfers. In practice, however, some households received both transfers in 
compensation for labor (referred to as public works [PW] transfers) and free transfers (referred to as 
direct support [DS]). In the CSA
5
Each beneficiary type (PW and DS beneficiaries) could potentially receive either of the payment 
types (cash or food). In the 2006 IDS/Indak survey, it is interesting and perhaps somewhat surprising to 
note that the prevalence of DS beneficiaries was higher among the cash recipients than among the food 
recipients. Specifically, of the beneficiaries who received cash only, 73 percent were PW and 27 percent 
were DS beneficiaries. In contrast, of the food-only recipients, 80 and 20 percent were PW and DS 
beneficiaries, respectively (Devereux et al. 2006). 
/International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) survey conducted 
in 2006 to analyze the impact of the PSNP, 7 percent of all PSNP beneficiaries received both labor-
compensated transfers and free transfers, whereas 78 and 15 percent received only the former and only 
the latter, respectively (Gilligan et al. 2007). This finding may reflect cases of households receiving PW 
transfers and DS at different times during the survey period. Sharp, Brown, and Teshome (2006) describe 
some study sites in which women reaching advanced stages of pregnancy were temporarily being 
recategorized from being a PW to a DS beneficiary. Or it may reflect households receiving, at any given 
time, a combination of PW and DS—an arrangement recommended as an option in Sharp, Brown, and 
Teshome 2006 for households that are not completely devoid of household members who can provide 
labor but have only limited labor power. 
At the outset of the PSNP, it was anticipated that each year 734,286 households (or 5.14 million 
people, under the assumption of a household size of 7 people) would receive PSNP transfers. Of them, 
587,429 households (or 80 percent) were expected to participate in public works and the remainder to 
receive DS. According to government documentation in 2009, more than 7 million people have received 
PSNP transfers (MoARD 2009b); the figure is set at 7.57 million people (over 1 million households) in 
World Bank 2009b. 
                                                       
5 CSA is the Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency.  
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Other Food Security Programs and Household Asset Building Program (HABP) 
The OFSP has three main components: (1) agricultural input packages (for example, seeds, fertilizer, and 
agricultural extension) made available to households on subsidized credit; (2) productive assets also given 
on credit to households, such as livestock, poultry, and agricultural equipment; and (3) resources provided 
to regional and local governments to construct community assets such as roads, drinking water facilities, 
irrigation structures, and other infrastructure. According to MoARD (2009b), more than 692,000 
households received credit through the government’s Federal Food Security budget line from 2005 to 
2007. (However, from the document it is unclear whether this refers strictly to OFSP recipients or more 
broadly to all recipients of government credit through the above-mentioned budget line.). 
The OFSP plays a critical role in the overall FSP’s overriding goal established by the 
government, namely, to maximize the number of households that graduate out of the program by moving 
them out of chronic food insecurity. Only those households that are receiving the OFSP household asset 
or input packages are assessed in terms of their progress toward graduation—as opposed to those 
households only receiving the PSNP transfers, which are not necessarily expected to be able to graduate 
(Devereux et al. 2008). It is also this role of the OFSP packages as a needed complement to PSNP to 
bring households toward graduation that led to a reprioritization, after the first year of the overall 
program, in targeting of OFSP packages to households that are also PSNP beneficiaries (Slater et al. 
2006). The federal government set itself a goal of covering 30 percent of PSNP recipients also with an 
OFSP package. The CSA/IFPRI 2006 survey showed that this rate was not achieved in some regions and 
was far exceeded in others. For example, in Tigray 62 percent of the PSNP beneficiaries also received 
OFSP benefits, while the share in Oromia was only 11 percent (Gilligan et al. 2007). 
Very recently, in 2009, donor agencies began support for a Household Asset Building Program 
(HABP), which in content and substance essentially comprises two of the components of the OFSP—
namely, subsidized credit to households to purchase assets, and agricultural input packages. World Bank 
(2009b) describes donor support to the HABP in detail.
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The Resettlement Component of the FSP 
 Dom (2009) discusses the evolution from donor 
support exclusively of the PSNP to extending support for the HABP/household asset and input provision 
component of the OFSP. Development partners sought to redesign the asset and input packages to make 
the accompanying extension services more demand driven, expand support for nonfarm activities, and 
delink the provision of credit from being exclusively tied to government agencies in order to make 
financial services more sustainable. Given that donor engagement with the HABP/OFSP household 
transfers is very new, robust evidence is still outstanding on the extent to which the design of these 
services has indeed been sustainably reformed, and if it has, what the impact of this redesign is. 
By 2006, the government had resettled about 170,000 households (World Bank 2006), and in the early 
part of that year, resettlement out of the Tigray region was mostly completed. However, in the subsequent 
three years—that is, by 2009—the cumulative number of households resettled through the FSP was only 
188,874 according to World Bank (2009b), or 205,000 according to MoARD (2009b), suggesting a 
substantial frontloading of the implementation of the resettlement component of FSP. By 2009, the 
program had only resettled less than half of the planned 440,000 households (or 2.2 million people), with 
the latter number originally intended to be resettled within the first three years of the FSP (FSCB 2004). 
The frontloading in practice also contrasts with the intended slight backloading, as in each of the three 
years the number of households resettled was meant to be approximately 100,000, 150,000, and 190,000, 
respectively. 
The resettlement component of the FSP has several linkages and relationships with the other 
components. First, settler-receiving weredas were considered ineligible for PSNP transfers, since by 
                                                       
6 This project document does not mention the OFSP, whereas the past World Bank project document for the PSNP (World 
Bank 2006) discusses the OFSP. But at the time of the latter document, donor support for the FSP was restricted to the PSNP and 
did not extend to the OFSP, as the financial tables of World Bank (2006) show.  
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design only weredas deemed not food-insecure were considered as receiving weredas (World Bank 
2004). This applies also to households in receiving weredas after they have been resettled from a sending 
wereda to their new location (FSCB 2004). Second, if a household head resettles but other household 
members temporarily remain behind, these household members may still receive PSNP transfers if they 
fulfill the requisite eligibility criteria. Third, at least in the first year of the FSP, de facto targeting criteria 
for resettlement versus PSNP transfers seemed to have been used in a way so as to maximize graduation 
out of the program. Specifically, in the Amhara region those targeted for receiving the transfers were 
households closer to the food security threshold, likely with the goal that the transfers would have a 
greater impact on achieving graduation rates. In contrast, the landless, who also tended to be among the 
poorest and least likely to graduate, were more likely to fall among those slated for resettlement (Sharp, 
Brown, and Teshome 2006). 
Impact of the FSP 
In the first years of the program, there was a strong discrepancy between planned rollout of the FSP and 
actual implementation. This situation has also had tangible consequences on the impact of the program on 
food security and asset accumulation. Examining the June 2005 to May 2006 program period, Gilligan, 
Hoddinott, and Seyoum (2009) found no impact of participation in the PSNP public works—defined has 
having received any PW transfers—on food security, and in fact participation had a statistically 
significant negative effect on asset growth, with asset growth slower for the treatment than the 
nonbeneficiary (control) households. However, when considering only beneficiaries who received half or 
more of the transfers that they were supposed to receive as per the program design, a positive program 
impact is discernible for one of the measures of food security considered, and neither a positive nor a 
negative impact is found on asset accumulation. Considering a third definition of beneficiary—namely, 
those who received any PW as well as also received any type of OFSP—a stronger impact on a range of 
food security indicators is identified, although here too there is no effect on asset growth. 
Another study based on a longer time frame of the program, using the 2006 and 2008 CSA/IFPRI 
panel data focusing on certain components of the FSP, also offers a mixed picture (Gilligan et al. 2009a). 
It uses three definitions of being a beneficiary of the program similar to those used in Gilligan, Hoddinott, 
and Seyoum 2009. In Gilligan et al. 2009a, under the first definition of beneficiary (namely, being a 
recipient of any PW transfers), the program had no statistically significant impact on the value of 
livestock assets, though it had a positive impact on livestock holdings measured as physical units. At the 
same time, the program under this first definition in fact had a statistically significant negative impact in 
terms of distress asset sales (that is, beneficiaries engaged in greater distress sales than control 
households). Under a second definition of beneficiary (namely, being a recipient of PW transfers of an 
amount above 900 birr), again no impact was discerned on the value of livestock assets, a positive impact 
was observed on livestock assets measured in physical units, and neither a positive nor a negative impact 
was identified on distress sales. A third definition—being a recipient of PW transfers above 900 birr as 
well as of OFSP packages—yielded positive results on both physical assets and their monetary value, but 
it still showed no impact on reducing distress sales. 
Analyses suggest the strongly limiting factors of the PSNP when the transfers to the households 
are “too little, too late”—that is, when transfers are less than planned and there are arrears and 
uncertainties in the timeliness of payments. Devereux et al. (2008) point to the challenges on this front in 
2007, with 71 percent of this study’s sample households reporting PSNP transfer delays, and 47 percent 
disagreeing that payment reliability had improved since PSNP started. 
Another study examined the differential impact of the PSNP on beneficiaries who received 
transfers in the form of food versus those who received cash. Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010) find 
that recipients of food transfers, and to some extent beneficiaries who received a mix of food and cash 
transfers, displayed higher income growth and greater food security as compared with nonbeneficiaries. 
However, cash-only beneficiaries did not show any statistically significantly better outcomes in terms of 
income changes, asset changes, or food security compared with nonbeneficiaries. This study, which  
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examines a time period (2006–2008) during which Ethiopia was visited by record-breaking food price 
increases, highlights the importance of building in mechanisms to limit the susceptibility of beneficiaries 
to such price shocks, such as indexing the cash transfer amount to inflation and building contingency 
funds into the program. 
The productive safety net transfers could have effects not only on food consumption and wealth 
but also on economic activity. A preliminary study, drawing on the CSA/IFPRI two-year panel data of 
2006 and 2008, examines the extent to which the program crowded out supply of labor to the private 
labor market and increased credit use (Gilligan et al. 2009b). Using the same three definitions of 
beneficiary as Gilligan, Hoddinott, and Seyoum (2009), the study finds that there is indeed a labor supply 
crowding out effect, especially for male household members, under the first two definitions of beneficiary 
(that is, one who receives any PSNP payment and receives at least half the planned PSNP payment). For 
beneficiaries defined as those who receive any PSNP transfers as well as OFSP, participation does not 
crowd out households’ supply of labor to the private market. Participation—under any of the three 
definitions—significantly increases the use of credit. However, under the first two definitions, this is 
primarily driven by a higher demand for loans for covering consumption needs, whereas under the third 
definition (one who receives both PSNP and OFSP), the effect on credit demand derives from greater use 
of productive credit. The latter is to be expected, as productive credit is a key element of OFSP packages. 
Beneficiaries, however, also report having encountered greater problems in repaying loans, which may be 
a function of the fact that they are also more likely to take out a loan than are nonbeneficiaries. 
A special segment of the labor market—namely, child labor—may also be affected by the PSNP, 
albeit with reverse normative implications. Hoddinott, Gilligan, and Seyoum (2010) examine how 
participation of households in the PW component of the FSP has affected child labor and child schooling, 
distinguishing effects by age and gender of children. The potential presence of both an income effect 
(which may decrease child labor and increase school attendance) and a labor demand effect (which could 
have the reverse impact) make likely outcomes a priori inconclusive. The findings of the study point to 
broadly salutary effects on child labor, in that PW transfers lead to reduced use of children as labor 
compared with households not receiving such transfers; however, when PW transfers are coupled with 
household receipts of OFSP packages, girls are more likely to be drawn into domestic chores (while some 
positive effects for boys are still identified). Girls’ school attendance is negatively affected by PW 
transfers in general, but when considering only transfers larger than a threshold monetary amount, this 
negative impact is reversed, possibly through a predominating income effect. 
Government and Donor Financing of the FSP 
Table 3 presents a breakdown of resource allocation and financing of the PSNP since its inception. The 
World Bank is the largest donor to this program. The second largest (U.S. Agency for International 
Development, or USAID) and WFP provide most, if not all, of the contributions in-kind. In the early 
years of the FSP, the government allocated approximately US$230
 million per year from its own 
resources (World Bank 2006).
7
The resettlement program is fully financed by government resources; that is, it does not draw on 
non-budget-supported donor funds (World Bank 2006). In the government’s poverty reduction strategy 
paper, it estimated that the resettlement program under the FSP would require a total of 1.2 billion birr, or 
$138 million at the exchange rate at the time of the cost estimation (MoFED 2005). In the design, it was 
planned that the federal government would disburse to the regions grants to be used for the resettlement 
program, and the regions would allocate resources out of these funds to the sending and receiving 
weredas as required for carrying out the resettlement (World Bank 2004). 
 Starting in 2010, the government planned to allocate out of its own funds 
annually about $160 million, and in addition the equivalent of $53 million in-kind for the non-PSNP 
components of the FSP—that is, for the resettlement program, household agricultural packages, and the 
creation of community assets (World Bank 2009b). 
                                                       
7 All dollars are in U.S. dollars.  
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Table 3. Expenditures on, and financing of, the Productive Safety Net Program
8 
Phase:  1  2  3  Average 
Period:  2005–06  2007–09  Addt’l
*  2010–14  Annual 
Type of costs           
Public works  51.8  353.3  17.4  1,098.3  152.1 
Direct support  12.9  210.8  4.3  274.6  50.3 
Institutional support  1.3  47.8    77.4  12.6 
Physical contingencies  4.0  3.0      0.7 
Price contingencies    3.0      0.3 
Contingencies for household transfers    139.8    274.6  41.4 
Capital and administrative costs    132.7  3.8  274.5  41.1 
Drought risk financing    25.0    160.0  18.5 
Support to the Household Asset Building 
Program        83.3  8.3 
Performance incentive grants        14.2  1.4 
Total  70.0  915.3  25.6  2,256.9  326.8 
Source of funding           
World Bank  70.0  175.0    480.0  72.5 
USAID    38.0    530.9  56.9 
DfID    194.6    324.1  51.9 
European Commission    195.6    78.7  27.4 
IrishAid    18.0    80.6  9.9 
CIDA    14.4    81.8  9.6 
Other    56.5    23.0  8.0 
WFP    26.6    50.0  7.7 
Netherlands        71.3  7.1 
Trust funds      25.6    2.6 
Government  0.1  2.0    10.0
†  1.2 
Total funds  70.1  720.7  25.6  1,730.4  254.7 
Financing gap    194.6    526.5  72.1 
Total  70.1  915.3  25.6  2,256.9  326.8 
Sources: World Bank 2004, 2006, 2009a, 2009b.  
Note: USAID = United States Agency for International Development; DfID = Department for International Development; CIDA 
= Canadian International Development Agency; WFP = World Food Program. 
*Funding supplemental to Phase 2. Estimated U.S. dollar value of Euro funds, based on 1 Euro = $1.3363.  
†All of these funds are allocated to the Household Asset Building Program component. Funds are in nominal U.S. dollars. 
                                                       
8 The U.S. dollar/Ethiopian birr average exchange rate in 2005 was US$1 to 8.83 Ethiopian birr, and in 2009 the average 
exchange rate was US$1 to 11.86 Ethiopian birr.  
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4.  DRINKING WATER IN ETHIOPIA 
Conceptualizing Access to Drinking Water: Physical Access, Water Quantity, and Water 
Quality 
An increase in access to drinking water can be measured along at least three dimensions: (1) greater ease 
and lower cost, including transaction costs in accessing a water source; (2) improvements in water 
quality; and (3) improvements in water quantity. Each dimension affects human welfare through distinct 
pathways. An important element in the first dimension is the physical distance to a water source. The 
lengthy time that people, often women, spend walking to a water site and back, and waiting their turn at 
the site, is time that could be used for other productive purposes, for example, agricultural production and 
nonfarm income-earning activities. In the case of children who also frequently have water-fetching 
responsibilities, reducing time for this activity would free up time for human capital accumulation 
through higher school attendance. Long travel for fetching water and the physical burden of carrying 
water, especially when no pack animal is used, have implications for women’s and children’s energy 
expenditure, requiring more food consumption to maintain a given health status. In addition to these 
transaction costs associated with fetching water, another element of the first dimension relates to direct 
costs, through cash or in-kind contributions for facility construction and maintenance and for water use. 
Spencer and Winkowska (1991) find in their study of a rural community in southeast Ethiopia a 
strong positive correlation between distance to the main source of water in the community and mortality. 
They also find that households farther from the water source make fewer trips to fetch water, implying 
lower household consumption of water. A more recent study analyzing the Ethiopian Rural Household 
Survey established that greater distance to water exercises a strong negative influence on agricultural 
labor productivity (Croppenstedt and Muller 2000). Gibson and Mace (2002), drawing on evolutionary 
life-history theory, consider the gain for women in terms of less exertion of energy due to easier access to 
water facilities. They hypothesize that an impact of reducing rural women’s water-carrying burden on the 
spacing of births (less burden decreases the spacing) and on the time until menses resumes after birth (less 
burden shortens this time) would be a reflection of women with easier water access expending less 
energy. Their study in southern Ethiopia in fact finds that women in villages in which water taps were 
installed—on average reducing time spent fetching water from 6 hours to 30 minutes per day—had in the 
years subsequent to installation shorter birth spacing and sooner return to menses after birth.  
The second dimension of access to drinking water is the extent to which water that households 
use is safe for consumption. Water-borne diseases are rampant in rural Ethiopia, caused in great part by 
consumption of water from unimproved sources, which suffer contamination from fecal and other 
sources. One of the major water-borne diseases, diarrhea, is responsible for more than 17 percent of 
deaths in children younger than five years in Ethiopia—likely a strong underestimate, as this percentage 
does not include diarrhea deaths during the neonatal period (WHO 2006). In a randomized controlled trial 
in a rural community in Ethiopia, Boisson et al. (2009) found that diarrheal diseases can be importantly 
reduced even where protected water sources do not exist, through the use of low-cost water treatment 
devices. 
Natural and environmental conditions can exacerbate the quality of drinking water obtained both 
from water facilities and from unimproved sources such as rivers and lakes. One such problem is 
excessive fluoride content, which is particularly endemic in Ethiopia’s Rift Valley. In a recent study, 41 
percent of water samples across the Rift Valley had excessive levels of fluoride (Tekle-Haimanot et al. 
2006). The severe form of the disease, fluorosis, can be debilitating and cannot be effectively treated after 
onset. Environmental dynamics also affect water quality. With biomass (wood) as the dominant rural 
source of energy, and with increased agricultural extensification entailing farmers transforming 
woodlands to farmland, deforestation has been an ongoing environmental challenge in Ethiopia. It has 
consequences not only for agricultural production but also for access to drinking water. Since riparian 
forests contribute to water purification, deforestation in Ethiopia has exacerbated the already limited 
access to potable water (Reynolds, Farley, and Huber 2009). Deforestation also has the potential to  
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increase the contamination of unprotected sources of water, when resultant soil erosion washes sediments 
and human and animal waste into lakes and other natural water sources. 
Not only the quality but of course also the quantity of water—the third dimension of water access 
discussed here—is an integral ingredient to human health. Several water- and health-related organizations 
identify the availability of at least 20 liters per person per day (for the main domestic uses—that is, 
drinking, cooking, and washing) as reasonable access to water; water only for drinking in tropical 
climates should be approximately 3 liters per person per day (see Howard and Bartram [2003] for an 
overview of the literature on water quantity requirements). This third dimension of access to water, water 
quantity, is of course intimately connected to the first. In the arid areas of Ethiopia, including most parts 
of Afar region, Somale region, and the southernmost areas of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
(SNNP) region, severe water scarcity prevails, requiring travel of greater distances to access water. In 
these areas characterized by pastoral livelihoods, seasonal migration to areas that received relatively 
better rains is not uncommon. However, because water scarcity is ubiquitous, this usually means that 
already vulnerable locales receive migrants from even worse-off areas, stretching the water resources of 
the host areas even more. This was the case recently, for example, when Borenas from drought-ravaged 
northern Kenya had to migrate north to Moyale, leading to more rapid depletion of water resources there 
(ACF 2010). 
Access to Drinking Water in Ethiopia 
Table 4 presents the share of the population with access to improved water in Ethiopia and, as a 
comparison, the mean of Sub-Saharan African countries. Based on these data, Ethiopia has seen a steady 
increase in access to safe water sources, albeit from a very low base. This increase is most pronounced in 
rural areas, where the table shows access to improved water sources relatively rapidly ascending from 4 to 
31 percent over an approximately 15-year time span. This sustained increase, however, has not been 
enough to allow Ethiopia to catch up with Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Rural areas in Ethiopia fall 
clearly behind rural Sub-Saharan Africa, while urban Ethiopia is far ahead. 
Table 4. Access to improved water, Ethiopia and Sub-Saharan Africa in comparison 
  1990  1995  2000  2006 
Ethiopia 
Total  13  20  29  42 
Rural  4  10  19  31 
Urban  74  79  87  96 
Average Sub-Saharan Africa 
Total  49  51  55  58 
Rural  35  38  42  46 
Urban  82  81  81  81 
Source: WDI 2010. 
An examination of different data sources is also of interest, not only to examine trends in water 
access figures but also to discern the robustness of the most commonly used such indicators for Ethiopia. 
Table 5 shows access to improved water based on the Ethiopian government’s 2005–2010 poverty 
reduction strategy paper (PASDEP, or Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty), 
releases of the World Development Indicators (WDI) from two different years, and 2010 data from the 
Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The description of the indicator given by each source 
is also included.  
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Table 5. Access to improved drinking water, comparison across sources (in percentage of total, 
rural, and urban population) 
Source  Indicator as stated in source  ‘90 ‘95  ‘96  ‘98  ‘00  ‘02  ‘03  ‘04  ‘05  ‘06 ‘08 
Country                          
PASDEP (Table 1.3)  Access to potable water (0.5 km)                42
*       
PASDEP (Table 2.7)  Source of drinking water is safe       19.1  23.7  27.9      35.9       
PASDEP (Table 3.1)  Access to clean water            30
+ 37.9‡         
WDI 2004  Access to improved water source  25        24             
WDI 2010  Access to improved water source  13  20      29          42   
WHO/UNICEF (2010)   Served with improved water  17  22      28        35    38 
Rural                         
PASDEP (Table 2.7)  Source of drinking water is safe       9.6  13.7  17.1      25.2       
WDI 2004  Access to improved water source  17        12             
WDI 2010  Access to improved water source  4  10      19          31   
WHO/UNICEF (2010)  Served with improved water  8  12      18        24    26 
Urban                         
PASDEP (Table 2.7)  Source of drinking water is safe       72.1  83.5  91.7      92.4       
WDI 2004  Access to improved water source  80        81             
WDI 2010  Access to improved water source  74  79      87          96   
WHO/UNICEF (2010)  Served with improved water  77  82      88        95    98 
Source: See first column of table. 
Note: PASDEP = Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty; WDI = World Development Indicators; 
WHO = World Health Organization; UNICEF = United Nations Children’s Fund. 
*End of 2004/05. 
 
+Status at beginning of the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) period (2002/03–2004/05).  
‡Signifies end of 2003/04. 
The wide array of figures for the same area (for example, rural versus urban) and same year is 
immediately striking. For example, the share of the rural population with access to an improved/safe 
water source in 2004 ranges from 11 percent according to the WDI 2008, to 25 percent according to 
PASDEP. For 1990 the lowest figure is 4 percent in the WDI 2010 and the highest is 17 percent in the 
WDI 2004. 
The interpretation of the data in terms of trends over time can be significantly changed depending 
on the data used. Table 5 in fact shows a pattern of estimates for 1990 decreasing from the early (2004) to 
the later (2010) publication dates of the database, and estimates for more recent years (for example, 2000) 
increasing in the later publication dates. As a consequence, the data from the WDI 2004 release show a 
decrease in rural access to improved water over time (which may happen, for example, when more 
facilities fall into disrepair than are being constructed or rehabilitated),
9
                                                       
9 WSP (2004) reports that in the mid-nineties, a survey showed that between 18 percent (in Tigray) and 67 percent (in 
Beneshangul-Gumuz) of rural water schemes were nonfunctioning. 
 whereas the WDI 2010 shows a 
clear increase in access over time. Thus, a degree of caution is warranted in relying heavily on one such 
indicator without further information about the reason for the discrepancies.  
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5.  DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Benefit incidence analysis describes how the benefits of public services are distributed among different 
groups in society—for example, groups categorized by income or wealth, gender, or gender of the head of 
household. Benefit incidence analysis is primarily concerned with the incidence of public services and 
infrastructure across different social or economic groups in society, and not with the impact that access to 
these services may have on other outcomes, such as household income or agricultural productivity. 
Benefit incidence analysis also does not account for the potentially differential valuations of the public 
service that individual users may make. 
This section only very briefly summarizes the key features of benefit incidence analysis 
employed in this study, as the general methodology is already described elsewhere in detail (for example, 
in Demery 2003, Glick et al. 2004, and van de Walle 1994). We first describe the data used in this study 
and then discuss some methodological considerations when assessing the incidence of public expenditures 
on services; we also distinguish average from marginal incidence. The final subsection lays out the 
measure of welfare used as a basis for determining incidence—namely, household wealth—and provides 
information on some features of the distribution of wealth among the study households. 
Description of the Data 
This study draws on two sets of surveys. The first set is individual-, household-, and kebele-level surveys 
that were conducted jointly in 2009 by the Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEPRI) and the 
IFPRI. The second set consists of the Wereda/City Benchmarking Surveys, which were financed by the 
World Bank, managed and administered by Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and 
implemented by Selam Consult in 2008. The design of the Wereda/City Benchmarking Surveys is 
described in detail in Wegener, Yaron, and Alemu 2007. 
The following describes the EEPRI/IFPRI Gender and Rural Services surveys (further details are 
described in the household survey guideline for field staff, IFPRI/EEPRI 2008). Eight weredas, which are 
located in seven regions, were selected on the basis of four criteria. One criterion in this purposive 
method of wereda selection was that the weredas be also part of the Wereda/City Benchmarking Survey 
dataset, which collects information at the wereda government level (for example, public spending and 
local government capacity), so that these two datasets can be linked and the public spending benefit 
incidence of programs can be determined. Second, the eight weredas were to be composed of four FSP 
weredas and four non-FSP weredas, as the FSP was intended to be one of the three interventions of 
interest for this study. 
Third, the wereda choice was affected by the plan to conduct future research focused on 
decentralization and rural service delivery. On this basis, the eight weredas were selected as four wereda 
pairs, such that each pair would consist of two weredas that are contiguous to each other but belong to 
different regions. Of the two regions associated with a wereda pair, one is in a “leading” region in which 
local-level decentralization has taken place, and the other is in a “lagging,” or “emerging,” region that has 
not yet experienced local-level decentralization. There are three such wereda pairs; the fourth pair 
consists of a wereda in the Amhara region and one in the Tigray region. Both are considered leading 
regions, but local empowerment and community mobilization have had a longer and distinct history in 
Tigray, making this an interesting and relevant comparison. Fourth, from the few weredas that fulfilled 
the three criteria stated above, the final selection of the eight weredas was guided by an intent to capture 
diverse agroecological, livelihoods, and remoteness characteristics. 
From each of the 8 weredas, 4 kebeles were randomly sampled. In each of the resulting 32 
selected kebeles, households were stratified into beneficiaries of the FSP and nonbeneficiaries. Fifteen 
households were randomly drawn from the kebele’s FSP beneficiary list and 20 households from the 
comprehensive list of households in the kebele, excluding those in the FSP beneficiary list. This resulted 
in a total of 35 households per sampled kebele, and a planned household sample size of 1,120 (the final 
sample size after data cleaning was 1,118). In each household, the questionnaire was administered  
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separately to both the household head and the spouse, with only a few modules relating to general 
household-level information (for example, household assets and demographic composition of the 
household) administered only to the head. 
Quantitative kebele-level surveys were also conducted in the same weredas as the household 
survey. Separate questionnaires were used for eight respondent types; in each kebele, the following were 
interviewed: one focus group, one wereda council member, one female and one male kebele council 
member, the (single) kebele council speaker, the (single) kebele chairperson, two DAs (the crop DA and 
the livestock DA), the head of one water committee, and the head of the multipurpose agricultural 
cooperative. For those respondent types of which there are multiple in a kebele, the selected respondent or 
respondents were sampled randomly from their category—for example, one female kebele council 
member was drawn randomly from the list of all female kebele council members in the given kebele. The 
kebele-level surveys were conducted not only in the sample kebeles in which the household survey was 
undertaken but in all of the kebeles of the eight selected weredas. 
The fieldwork also included qualitative case studies in four of the eight weredas, as well as an 
additional wereda outside of the eight. In each case study wereda, key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions took place in the wereda capital town and one kebele, resulting in a total of 105 
respondents. In the wereda capitals, interviews took place with wereda government officials responsible 
for finance and budget, agricultural extension, drinking water, and women’s affairs; the speaker of the 
wereda council; local ruling party leaders or senior members of the wereda (in the cases of all weredas, 
this was the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front [EPRDF] or affiliated parties); and 
leaders of the wereda women’s association, the cooperative union. At the kebele level, the field team 
interviewed DAs; the kebele manager; the speaker of the kebele council; the kebele chairperson; members 
of the kebele cabinet responsible for agriculture, drinking water, and women’s affairs; leaders of the 
agricultural cooperative, the women’s association, and the ruling party; members of a water committee; 
and male and female farmers. The team prepared interview guides for discussions with key informants 
and focus groups. 
Using Information on Public Expenditures to Undertake Benefit Incidence Analysis 
There are two main ingredients in determining the incidence of the public supply of services. The first 
ingredient is information on the distribution of the use of public services, for example, through 
information on which individuals receive and which do not receive agricultural extension advice. The 
second ingredient is information on public resource allocation for the provision of these services. This 
information is predominantly captured by public expenditures for a given service, but in certain cases it 
can be estimated by aggregating different components of the cost of providing a service or infrastructure. 
Information on public expenditures or unit costs help to quantify the supply of services, thus enabling a 
comparison of, for example, benefit incidence across different sectors or subsectors. The use of 
information on public resource allocation also mitigates the common problem faced in trying to account 
for quality (as opposed to only quantity) differences in public services. 
The following summarizes the main building blocks in determining public spending benefit 
incidence. Let 𝐸𝑙
𝑖 refer to the number of residents of location/administrative unit l with access to a public 
service i, and let 𝐸 𝑗𝑙
𝑖  be the notation for those in location l with access to service i who fall into some 
income or wealth quantile j. 𝑆𝑙
𝑖 is the amount of public expenditures by the government of location l on 
public service i. Then, the amount of public expenditures for service i accruing to those individuals in the 








and the public spending accruing to all quantile j residents as 𝑋𝑗
𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑙
𝑖 𝐿
𝑙=1 . The benefit incidence of 
public resources for a given service can be expressed in the form of a percentage of the resources that  
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𝑗 = 1. The benefit incidence shares of these quantiles can be directly compared with one another 
to ascertain the differential benefits that various economic groups receive, as quantiles by definition refer 
to equal-sized shares of the population. However, when generalizing j to refer to any subcategorization of 
the population (for example, men and women, female- and male-headed households, or even when j refers 
to, say, women who fall into different quantiles of the population), it is no longer necessarily true that the 
size of these groupings are equal. Thus, the benefit incidence share 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 for the different groups is not as 
immediately informative about the extent of equity of investments in a public service. It is then useful to 
obtain the ratio between the benefit share 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 and the share of j in the reference population, which we will 
refer to as the benefits-to-population (BP) odds ratio. A case of fully equitable benefits from public 
investments in a sector would then be indicated by a BP odds ratio of 1 for all j. 
Some incidence analyses rely only on information on the use of services and do not draw on cost 
or public spending data, usually due to data constraints. But aside from constraints, there are other reasons 
for relying only on service use data, relating to certain drawbacks in proxying the magnitude of benefits 
by using public expenditure/cost data. For example, some of the variation in the amount of resources 
allocated in different areas or to different sectors may reflect differences in efficiency, or transaction 
costs, and not quality or quantity of services. For example, two hypothetical areas may receive the same 
amount and quality of a public service, but public spending in the more remote area is higher because it 
costs more to provide the same amount of service. Similarly, in a given area, the bureaucracy working in 
one sector may be more efficient than the administration responsible for another sector, resulting in the 
former’s being able to provide a given quality and quantity of service with comparatively fewer resources. 
Due both to data constraints on public spending in some sectors and to the limitations just discussed, this 
study presents most results both with and without the use of public expenditure data to see whether the 
core findings are robust to these alternative approaches. 
When assessing the benefit incidence of public spending, there are inherent challenges in 
determining the temporal dimension of the cycle from expending resources, to the generation of services, 
and finally to their use. For simplicity several studies have assumed contemporaneity; that is, they have 
assigned some indicator of service use in one year to public spending of the same year (for example, 
Castro-Leal 1999; Lanjouw et al. 2001; van de Walle 1994).
10
Most public spending benefit incidence analyses also implicitly assume the same levels of public 
spending across localities within a country, by basing the calculation of unit costs of services on 
nationally aggregated public expenditure data. Castro-Leal (1999)
 However, there is often a lag between the 
allocation of resources and the production—and even more, the use—of services, as discussed in the 
related literature on the impact of and returns to public spending (see a methodological overview in Benin 
et al. 2008). Due to this lag, and because the provision of services is ultimately the cumulative 
consequence of past spending, this study builds on this notion in its assessment of the benefit incidence of 
public spending, and it uses the cumulative amounts of public spending at the wereda level for the three 
years preceding the use data. 
11
                                                       
10 For the public cost of services, this paper relies on unit-cost estimates from other studies; however, these unit costs are 
based on public spending data from the same year as the survey data used to obtain information on access to and use of public 
services. 
 is one of the exceptions, using 
11 In the case of some wereda-service combinations, no expenditure data were available, in which case the average of the  
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province-specific data for South Africa. In this study, we differentiate levels of public spending on the 
basis of which benefit incidence is assessed, by wereda, rather than using uniform figures. For this we 
draw on public expenditure data from the Wereda/City Benchmarking Survey described in Section 5. 
Table 6 summarizes cumulative local public expenditures in the eight weredas under study. 
Table 6. Wereda public spending on agricultural extension and the Food Security Program, 
cumulative 1997EC–1999EC (birr)
12 
Wereda  Region  Extension 
FSP household transfers/packages
* 
OFSP  Public works  Direct support 
Bati  Amhara  4,374,433  —  8,123,955  31,673,952 
Gog  Gambella  3,567,735       
Ibantu  Oromia  1,603,718       
Ofla  Tigray  14,277,046  0  3,922,069  3,805,004 
Sekota  Amhara  6,925,951  0  43,745,824  5,116,164 
Sheko  SNNP  3,281,116       
Telalak  Afar  2,000,846  0  0  515,568 
Yaso  Beneshangul-Gumuz  7,771,407       
Source: Authors’ compilation from the Wereda/City Benchmarking Survey. 
Note: EC = Ethiopian calendar; FSP = Food Security Program; OFSP = Other Food Security Programs; SNNP = Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. 
*Data for the  FSP pertain only to those four weredas in which the FSP operates. 
Average and Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis 
This paper distinguishes between the average and marginal benefit incidence of the public programs. 
Average incidence refers to the way that overall benefits from, say, services and programs are distributed 
across different wealth groups and gender. However, there may be differences in the extent to which the 
poor versus the nonpoor benefit at earlier stages of the rollout of a program and in how much these 
different groups benefit when the program is further expanded. Average incidence analysis provides 
information that effectively aggregates these effects, which may potentially differ by the state of the 
program. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999b) discuss this conceptually; one of their examples is that of late 
capture of a food transfer scheme. In this example, because the program is initially targeted to the poor, 
the latter may see the greatest gains from the scheme; but as the nonpoor become more informed of its 
benefits and are able to exert political pressure, they may be able to gain more from the additional 
expansion of the scheme than from the intervention on average. 
Figure 1, adapted from Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999b), graphically illustrates the distinction 
between average and marginal incidence. Consider an expansion of a government program such that on 
average, participation increases from A to B. Prior to the expansion, the average incidence of the poorest 
group is greater than that of the least poor (AP > ALP). After expansion, the average incidence is still pro-
poor, with the poorest participating at a higher rate than the better-off (BP > BLP). However, the marginal 
incidence of the wealthiest group is greater than that of the poorest (BLP – ALP > BP – AP). 
                                                                                                                                                                           
survey’s sample rural weredas in the corresponding region was used. 
12  The Ethiopian calendar year is either seven or eight years lower than the corresponding Western calendar year. For 
example, the Ethiopian calendar year 2003EC commenced on September 11, 2010.  
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Figure 1. Average versus marginal incidence 
 
Source: Adapted from Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999b. 
These two aspects of benefit incidence can be compared through the average and the marginal 
odds ratio of access to a public service. The average participation rate is the proportion of households in a 
given wealth quantile that participate in a program, or use a public service. The average odds ratio of 
participation is defined as the ratio of the participation rate of one quantile to the overall average odds 
ratio. We can interpret the average odds ratio of participation as the overall distributional incidence of 
government spending. For example, if the average odds ratio of participation in the FSP for the poorest 
quintile equals 1.5, and for the second poorest quintile it is 1.3, this shows that the poorest quintiles 
benefit disproportionately from the service; however, the gains to the poorest are proportionately even 
higher than those to the second poorest. 
The marginal odds ratio of participation is the increment in the program participation rate of a 
given quintile when there is a change in aggregate participation. If we assume that the cost to the 
government is the same across geographic areas and income groups, we can derive from the marginal 
odds of participation how an increase in public spending on a given program will affect each quintile. For 
example, a marginal odds ratio of participation in the FSP for the poorest quintile of 1.5 and for the 
richest quintile of 0.4 means that if an extra 100 birr per capita is spent on the FSP, public expenditures 
on food security per capita going to the poorest quintile will rise by 150 birr, and the equivalent benefits 
accruing to the richest group will increase by 40 birr. 
To estimate the marginal odds ratio of participation, we follow the approach proposed by 
Lanjouw et al. (2001) and regress quintile-specific participation rates across the kebele, the lower 
geographic area, on the average participation rate of the wereda, the upper geographic area (all quintiles, 
all kebeles) for each program. We use the leave-out mean as an instrumental variable for the wereda's 
average participation rate to avoid the bias that the ordinary least squares estimation can give, as the 
wereda overall mean participation rate is affected by the specific kebele and quintile participation rates. 
The leave-out mean is the mean for the wereda excluding the specific kebele and quintile participation 
rates that correspond to each observation in the data. For example, if we use the data for Quintile 3 in 
Kebele 5 within Wereda 8, then the leave-out mean is the average for all kebele and quintiles within 
Wereda 8, excluding Quintile 3 in Kebele 5.  
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Categorizing Households into Welfare Groups for Assessing the Incidence of Public 
Services 
This study relies on a measure of household wealth, rather than a measure or proxy of household income, 
for welfare stratification into quantiles and analysis of the distributional incidence of public services (see, 
for example, Carter and Barrett 2006, and Brandolini, Magri, and Smeeding 2010, for a discussion of the 
merits and demerits of proxying poverty and welfare by using measures of wealth versus income or 
expenditure). Flow measures such as income and expenditure, especially in the absence of panel data, are 
not able to distinguish chronic poverty from highly transitory and short-lived poverty—or for that matter, 
similarly fleeting occurrences of relatively high levels of welfare. Consumption and expenditure measures 
are also much more difficult to collect and, if collected, to measure with a comfortable degree of 
accuracy. As the survey on which this study is based was centrally focused on capturing extensive 
information relating to access to, quality of, and accountability mechanisms surrounding the delivery of 
public services, it collected detailed information on assets to capture household welfare, heeding the 
literature proposing the strengths of asset-based measures of welfare and poverty, and did not collect 
consumption data. 
This asset value approach has been employed by various other studies within the African and 
Ethiopian contexts. A study of household duration and transition into and out of poverty in Ethiopia uses 
the value of assets as a measure of household wealth (Bigsten and Shimeles 2008). Also, in Ethiopia, an 
assessment of the impact of the productive safety nets measures the change in the value of assets, which 
comprises the value of livestock and tools owned (Gilligan, Hoddinott, and Seyoum 2009). Numerous 
studies across Africa have employed the value of assets as a measure of wealth for a variety of topics, 
including studies in South Africa on credit constraints (Baiyegunhi,  Fraser, and Darroch 2010), adult 
mortality and primary school attendance in rural Kenya (Yamano and Jayne 2005), and livelihood 
strategies in eastern Nigeria (Adi 2007). 
Three main types of wealth are captured in the core wealth measure used in the analysis: 
livestock; other agricultural assets, namely, tools and equipment such as ox ploughs and sickles; and 
consumer assets such as furniture, radios, and iron. All are aggregated in value terms on the basis of 
prices obtained from each asset type at the kebele level. There are, of course, additional sources of asset 
wealth for households in Ethiopia and other countries; however, for the following reasons they are not 
employed in this analysis. Land value was not included in this measure, given the challenges in assessing 
land values in the absence of land markets in Ethiopia. The wealth measure also does not include crops 
held in storage, given the high variability of this form of asset that can be quickly drawn down, for 
example, before the harvest period and just as quickly accumulated after the harvest. Thus, crops in 
storage being strongly seasonal in nature, a snapshot at a given point in time may not contribute to useful 
information about a household’s wealth status. Neither outstanding debts nor financial obligations are 
included as negative assets in the asset measure. 
Other asset types, such as the size and quality of housing and the existence and quality of toilet 
facilities, are difficult to assess in monetary value terms and thus are not included in the aggregate wealth 
measure. This omission is—for the purposes and in light of the objectives of this study—only of concern 
if, for example, housing quantity and quality does not substantially correlate with the wealth measure 
used. If it does not, then the categorization of households into wealth groups may look quite different with 
the inclusion of housing value than with its exclusion. However, in subsequent regression analysis (see 
Section 9) to determine the correlates of access to services, we are able to incorporate the wealth 
measures that cannot be easily valuated and are thus not included in the incidence analysis. 
It is not uncommon to find in the literature wealth being proxied by selected assets, such as by 
livestock in the pastoralist Ethiopian context in Lybbert et al.2004, or in the Chinese context in Jalan and 
Ravallion 2001 by the combined value of grain stocks, cash and bank deposits, agricultural equipment, 
livestock, and consumption assets, with a conscious exclusion of land given the difficulty in valuing land 
in the absence of a land sales market.  
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With this caveat, we proceed to provide a brief overview of the distribution of wealth levels by 
the households in the study area. Average household assets amount to about 48,000 birr. The largest 
component of these comprises agricultural tools and equipment, followed by livestock assets. 
Households’ consumer assets make up the smallest part of overall assets, with the mean value of this 
component only less than 2 percent of mean total assets. Table 7 also shows the distribution of asset 
components over quintiles based on each component (for example, among the 20 percent of households 
with the lowest value of agricultural equipment, the average household has 60 birr’s worth of agricultural 
tools). Comparing the average value of the asset components with their distribution shows that the larger 
components tend to be more unevenly distributed. Even though agricultural tools make up the largest part 
of assets overall, the poorest quintile based on this asset component has a lower value of agricultural 
assets than, correspondingly, the poorest livestock quintile and the poorest consumer assets quintile. 
Consumer assets, the smallest component, are least unequally distributed. 
Table 7. Household asset values, by quintile (birr)
* 
  Total  Q1 (poorest)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Gini 
Wealth                
All assets  47,761  1,172  7,648  33,306  71,561  125,193  0.553 
Agricultural 
equipment  33,258  60  271  15,297  50,259  102,109  0.633 
Livestock  13,813  90  2,219  6,754  13,870  46,182  0.660 
Consumer assets  690  81  180  386  939  1,881  0.540 
Wealth per capita               
All assets  9,067  259  1,693  5,750  11,421  26,235  0.582 
Agricultural 
equipment  6,388  13  58  2,157  8,481  21,279  0.685 
Livestock  2,536  19  436  1,302  2,484  8,457  0.657 
Consumer assets  143  15  38  82  163  420  0.569 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note:
 *These quintiles are based on each respective asset type; for example, the Q1 figure for consumer assets gives the mean 
consumer asset level of the 20 percent of households with the lowest consumer assets. The analogous situation holds for the other 
quintiles and asset types. 
In final column to the right of the table, Gini stands for the Gini coefficient. 
The second panel of Table 7 shows household wealth per capita, as opposed to household wealth. 
The average value of per capita assets of households is about 9,000 birr. The distributional features are 
quite similar to household wealth, in that the largest asset component is agricultural equipment, followed 
by livestock and consumer assets, the latter again making up less than 2 percent of total wealth per capita. 
And again, asset inequality of the larger components is higher than that of consumer assets. 
Whereas Table 7 captured the first moment (mean) and partial features of the second moment of 
asset distribution, Figure 2 graphically displays features of its third moment. As is common with wealth 
distributions, total assets as well as the component asset types are pronouncedly skewed to the right, with 
the bulk of households concentrated at the lower asset values in the distribution. Not necessarily as typical 
is the multimodality of the asset distribution seen here: both agricultural equipment and consumer assets 
have more than one mode (peak), resulting in a multipeaked total asset distribution.
13
                                                       
13 The alternate use of a very high bandwidth in obtaining the nonparametric density graphs, which “oversmooths” the 
curves, still retains the multimodality of the asset components and total assets, suggesting that this feature is relatively robust. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of household assets 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Female-headed households (FHHs) have lower wealth levels than male-headed households 
(MHHs); at the household level, FHH assets are about half the value of MHHs (Table 8). However, FHHs 
also usually tend to be smaller; thus, the table also considers household wealth per capita. In this case, the 
gender gap in wealth is still present but is much narrower than when one does not account for the smaller 
size of FHHs. Gender differences in overall household wealth are somewhat narrowed in the case of 
livestock assets. 
Table 8. Household wealth, by gender of household head (birr) 
  All assets  Agricultural 
equipment  Livestock  Consumer 
assets 
Household wealth         
FHHs  25,972  15,940  9,642  390 
MHHs  53,787  38,048  14,966  773 
Head–gender gap (ratio)  0.483  0.419  0.644  0.505 
Household wealth per capita       
FHHs  7,139  4,932  2,102  105 
MHHs  9,600  6,791  2,656  154 
Head–gender gap (ratio)  0.744  0.726  0.791  0.684 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: FHH = female-headed household; MHH = male-headed household.  
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Finally, Table 9 presents mean wealth levels by wereda. It shows a wide range in mean asset 
levels, with the highest mean asset level about 10 times larger than the lowest average asset level. The 
ranking of weredas by asset values also differs by asset type, which underlines the importance of 
examining the totality of the most important assets as opposed to only one asset type (for example, just 
livestock) as a proxy for wealth. 
Table 9. Household wealth by wereda 
Wereda  All assets  Agricultural 
equipment  Livestock  Consumer 
assets 
Household wealth         
Bati (Amhara)  31,559  21,010  10,282  268 
Gog (Gambella)  8,762  2,904  5,380  478 
Ibantu (Oromia)  89,399  64,707  23,496  1,196 
Ofla (Tigray)  9,177  1,651  7,096  431 
Sekota (Amhara)  8,619  2,170  6,156  293 
Sheko (SNNP)  93,248  83,318  8,407  1,523 
Telalak (Afar)  67,567  22,043  45,364  160 
Yaso (Beneshangul-Gumuz)  74,230  68,354  4,707  1,169 
Household wealth per capita       
Bati (Amhara)  6,766  4,758  1,952  56 
Gog (Gambella)  1,615  535  988  91 
Ibantu (Oromia)  12,395  9,062  3,163  169 
Ofla (Tigray)  2,091  310  1,664  118 
Sekota (Amhara)  2,048  556  1,410  82 
Sheko (SNNP)  20,592  18,538  1,681  373 
Telalak (Afar)  13,653  4,857  8,762  34 
Yaso (Beneshangul-Gumuz)  13,473  12,510  744  219 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: SNNP - Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. 
Although in the empirical microeconomic literature on developing countries, household 
consumption or income is practically always normalized by household size—that is, is expressed in per 
capita or per-adult-equivalent terms—there is less consistency when it comes to wealth or assets. The 
argument for using household-size–normalized measures of wealth is simple and analogous to the 
argument for doing so with income or consumption: considering a large household with many household 
members and a small household with only few members, but both with the same amount of overall 
wealth, it is intuitive to consider the larger household less well off (when considering the wealth measure 
as the key proxy for welfare). This of course does not mean that assets that are not captured in the wealth 
measure may not mitigate this conclusion. For example, household members—in particular, working-age 
ones—are not only consumers across which the returns or benefits from household wealth must be spread 
but also productive labor units that add to a household’s earnings and thus welfare. The difficulty in 
valuating labor assets and incorporating such assets into an aggregate measure of wealth means that there 
remains an inconclusive trade-off between using the value of household wealth (excluding labor assets) as 
a proxy for household welfare and using household wealth per capita. 
As mentioned above, the literature reflects the tentativeness in the choice between normalized and 
nonnormalized measures of assets as a proxy for household wealth. On the one hand, for example, Jalan 
and Ravallion (2002) proxy a household’s level of wealth as the value of its fixed productive assets per 
capita. Similarly, for analysis of the extent to which poorer versus richer households are protected against 
shocks, Jalan and Ravallion (1999) stratify households on the basis of their wealth per capita. In assessing 
the determinants of primary schooling, Ainsworth, Beegle, and Koda (2005) also control for household 
wealth using the value of household assets per capita. Both Bigman et al. (2000) and Mukherjee and  
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Benson (2003) consider the effect of household wealth on poverty, including per capita livestock value as 
a proxy for the former. On the other hand, however, some studies also consider total household assets, 
nonnormalized for household size, in analysis—for example, Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson (2010) 
and Andersson, Mekonnen, and Stage (2010). 
As seen in Table 8, using assets per capita as the basis for wealth categorization may make FHHs 
“look” better off, possibly producing results that may suggest lower pro-poor incidence. At the same time, 
using assets instead of assets per capita does not account for the lower welfare of larger households, 
holding wealth constant. In light of the lack of conclusiveness about the most appropriate approach, in the 
subsequent analysis in this paper, we consider most of the results based on both types of wealth measures; 
where only one measure is considered for economy of space, it will be total (that is, nonnormalized) 
household assets.  
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6.  THE BENEFIT INCIDENCE OF PUBLIC SPENDING ON  
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION 
As discussed in Section 2, the extent of contact with extension agents is very high in Ethiopia. This 
country stands out in international comparison with other developing countries in terms of the reach of 
agricultural extension in rural areas (IFPRI-WB 2010; Davis, Swanson, and Amudavi 2009). In this 
study, too, we find a high coverage rate, with more than one-third of farmers (including both women and 
men) having access to some form of agricultural extension service. The locational variety in access, 
however, is very large, as Table 10 shows. Telalak in the Afar region has by far the lowest access—less 
than 1 percent of respondents have any form of extension—while in Ofla in the Tigray region a strikingly 
high two-thirds of all respondents have access to extension. 
Table 10. Access to extension, by wereda 










Bati (Amhara)  12.66  22.78  5.49  3.38  32.91 
Gog (Gambella)  24.42  29.03  3.23  0.00  46.08 
Ibantu (Oromia)  8.33  19.70  1.14  1.14  23.11 
Ofla (Tigray)  42.20  51.83  6.42  0.46  66.51 
Sekota (Amhara)  32.92  41.25  3.75  0.83  58.75 
Sheko (SNNP)  19.29  21.26  1.18  0.00  33.07 
Telalak (Afar)  0.49  0.49  0.00  0.00  0.97 
Yaso (Beneshangul-Gumuz)  4.25  19.31  4.25  0.39  23.17 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: DA = development agent; ag. = agricultural; demonstr. = demonstration; FTC = farmer training center; SNNP = Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. 
This generally high extension coverage—with significant peaks in some study sites—as well as 
the wealth and gender incidence to be discussed below, warrants a more detailed description of how 
access to agricultural extension is measured in this study. As is well known, in Ethiopia extension agents 
are referred to as development agents because they come into contact with rural households for a range of 
activities that go beyond agricultural advisory services. DAs have been instrumental in the administration 
of the FSP, as discussed in the Introduction. They also play a role in collecting agricultural statistics for 
the Wereda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development (WoARD) and ultimately the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (FAO/WFP 2006). DAs, among others, visit households and hold 
meetings in order to mobilize community labor for infrastructure projects in the kebele (as also found in 
our qualitative case studies). Finally, being a DA involves a range of nonagricultural tasks and household 
contacts; many DAs are part of the kebele-level political executive body (kebele cabinet). 
Thus, for this analysis we sought to extract those DA–household contacts that pertain to the 
provision of agricultural advice. In the survey, these contacts are captured in four main ways. First, 
respondents are asked about community meetings they attended that were held to discuss agricultural 
issues. Follow-up questions address a range of issues with regard to these meetings, including who was 
the main organization or individual who organized the event, and which main agricultural topics were 
covered at the event. To be conservative, this first part of our measure of agricultural extension only 
includes those agriculture-related meetings that were held by DAs and do not include, for example, 
meetings held by the kebele chairperson. Meetings that had as their main topics only nonagricultural 
themes or agriculture-related themes unlikely related to the provision of information for improving 
farmers’ agricultural practices were excluded (an example of the latter exclusion would be the topic of 
land conflicts between farmers).  
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Second, the survey asked respondents about visits by experts to their homes. Follow-up questions 
included, among other things, the type of expert and the main topics discussed. This component of the 
extension measure then excluded visits by nonagricultural experts, visits by agricultural experts who do 
not have an advisory role but may provide other agricultural services (for example, veterinarians), and 
discussions with any expert about only nonagriculture-related topics. The third component of the measure 
captured respondent visits to demonstration plots or agricultural research stations or both. The final 
component draws on survey questions about respondents’ participation in FTC training. The time frame 
considered for engagement/participation in each component is the 12-month period preceding the 
interview. 
Table 11 shows the gender incidence of access to agricultural extension. The share of all heads of 
households who have access to agricultural extension, and the share of all men, is 44 and 47 percent, 
respectively. There is a clear gender gap in access to extension; only a quarter of all women, and a 
slightly smaller share of all spouses in households, have access to extension. The gender gap ratio—the 
ratio of women’s access to men’s access—is thus a low 0.5, as is the gap between spouses and household 
heads. A gap between access of heads and spouses is also obtained when considering only women, 
although this gap is not as large. Although one-third of all female heads have access to agricultural 
extension, 23 percent of female spouses do, resulting in a headship gap ratio of 0.7. The gap between 
heads’ and spouses’ access is clearly narrower when considering only women than when considering all 
respondents—this is of course not surprising, as nearly all spouses are women; thus, the overall headship 
gap captures, in a sense, both headship as well as gender differences. 
Table 11. Access to various extension modalities, by gender and headship status 
      Both men and 
women  Women  Men
*  Gender 
gap 
Both heads and 
spouses 
All extension  35.43%  25.22%  47.21%  0.534 
DA home visits  17.79%  15.37%  20.59%  0.746 
  DA ag. meetings  25.66%  14.68%  38.34%  0.383 
  Demonstr. plot  3.17%  1.08%  5.57%  0.194 
   FTC training




All extension  23.18%  22.84%       
DA home visits  14.47%  14.58%       
DA ag. meetings  12.16%  11.74%       
  Demonstr. plot  0.64%  0.52%       
Household 
heads  
All extension  44.03%  32.92%  47.08%  0.699 
DA home visits  20.13%  17.92%  20.73%  0.864 
  DA ag. meetings  35.13%  24.17%  38.14%  0.634 
  Demonstr. plot  4.94%  2.92%  5.50%  0.530 
Headship gap  All extension  0.526  0.694       
  DA home visits  0.719  0.814       
  DA ag. meetings  0.346  0.486       
  Demonstr. plot  0.130  0.177       
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: DA = development agent; ag. = agricultural; Demstr. = demonstration; FTC = farmer training center. 
*Summary statistics are not computed for male spouses, as the number in this category was very small in the sample. 
†Further breakdown is not provided for extension modalities with extremely low overall incidences.  
The qualitative case studies confirm the gender gap found in the data.
14
                                                       
14 More expansive discussion of qualitative research findings can be found in IFPRI-WB 2010. 
 Women farmers 
interviewed highlighted that they felt there was a discrepancy between what they heard about the 
government’s policy on reaching out to women with agricultural services—for example, on the radio—
and what they experienced themselves. Some DAs also stated explicitly that they exclusively worked with  
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household heads, even when providing information on crops that they knew were commonly handled by 
women in the area, expecting that the (male) household head would convey the information to his wife. 
The most frequent modality of extension service provision is community meetings convened by 
DAs during which agricultural issues are discussed. The second most common a mode by which farmers 
come into contact with extension agents is through visits to farm households by the DA. Much less 
common are visits by farmers to demonstration plots and research stations; finally, it is very rare for 
farmers to receive training at farmer training centers (FTCs), despite the considerable policy (government, 
as well as donor) attention given FTCs in Ethiopia recently. This is certainly not due to an absence of 
FTCs: 53 percent of the kebeles in the study weredas have FTCs. However, as other studies have shown 
(Davis, Swanson, and Amudavi 2009), the vast majority of FTCs in Ethiopia are essentially just the 
building structure, without adequate instructional equipment and other inputs to make them functional 
centers. 
The gender gap in extension access varies widely with the mode of access. For example, it is 
much less common for women than it is for men to visit demonstration plots and attend DA-convened 
meetings in which agriculture is discussed, whereas the gender gap is relatively narrower for receiving 
extension advice through DAs’ visits to households (see Table 11). Similar patterns are found with regard 
to the differential access of household heads versus spouses (also, when only comparing women heads 
with women spouses). The differing gender gap for different extension modalities may be expected to an 
extent, in light of possible cultural and social constraints for women (and in particular, women who are 
not the head of a household) venturing out of the house to attend formal meetings. 
In Table 11 it is of note that the gender (and headship) gap is much larger in the case of visits to 
demonstration plots than in the case of community meetings called by the DA—in the case of the latter, it 
is likely that these meetings serve purposes in addition to the provision of agricultural advice, whereas 
demonstration plot visits are likely to be focused on agriculture. Thus, the greater gap in the latter 
accentuates the gender discrepancy in access to agricultural expertise. 
The case studies highlight other cultural norms that may work in a different way in affecting the 
social acceptability of different extension modalities. Interviewed farmers and DAs in some of the 
qualitative case study sites pointed out that it is deemed not appropriate for (male) DAs to meet one-on-
one with women farmers (especially spouses of heads) alone. Several approaches were therefore 
employed to get around this cultural constraint. One of these approaches is the collaboration of DAs with 
women leaders in the kebele. For example, DAs made efforts to work with heads of kebele women’s 
associations, with kebele cabinet members for women’s affairs, and with the leaders of the EPRDF 
women’s league so that these leaders could mediate meetings between the DAs and women farmers. In 
part these meetings are undertaken in groups, in light of the constraining social norms pertaining to one-
to-one meetings between (male) DAs and women farmers. 
These types of group meetings, however, are different from the DA-convened community-wide 
meetings discussed above and captured in the incidence results in Table 11. Nevertheless, women farmers 
can encounter cultural gender-based constraints in both types of meetings for extension provision and 
other purposes. In case study interviews, local women’s leaders stated that some men are unenthusiastic 
about their spouses attending meetings facilitated by the women’s associations and the women’s party 
leagues; they are concerned that aside from agricultural issues, these meetings may be used to convey 
messages of women’s equality to their spouses. The local female leaders also pointed out that men 
occasionally display dismissive attitudes in community-wide public meetings when women speak up or 
ask questions. 
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the benefits of agricultural extension services through 
concentration curves and compares the distribution of the two most common forms of extension access. 
Concentration curves are similar to the familiar Lorenz curves for the graphic illustration of inequality in 
income or wealth measures, in that they map the cumulative distribution of the population (after ordering 
from poorest to wealthiest) against the cumulative distribution of a measure of benefit, in this case access 
to agricultural extension. That is, concentration curves, analogous to Lorenz curves, show that, say, the  
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poorest X percent of the population (read along the x-axis) obtain Y percent of the total benefits of the 
provision of a public service (y-axis). 
Figure 3. Concentration curves for agricultural extension services 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: DA = development agent; ag =  agricultural. The measure of access to all forms of extension accounts for extension 
modalities other than the two also displayed, that is, DA visits to farm and home and DA meetings. Thus, it is possible for the 
concentration curve for “all extension access” to lie outside the space between the other two curves. 
Concentration curves, however, differ from Lorenz curves in several important aspects. First, 
since the former are effectively a mapping of one variable (wealth) on another (extension service 
benefits), as opposed to a univariate exercise, concentration curves can lie below or above the 45-degree 
diagonal line, whereas Lorenz curves always lie below or on the diagonal line. A concentration curve 
lying on the 45-degree line suggests that access to services is perfectly egalitarian across the wealth 
spectrum. A curve above the line signifies that poorer segments of the population have better access to 
services than less poor households. Second, Lorenz curves are by construction and of necessity convex or 
semiconvex. Expressed in discrete terms, this means that the total wealth of a quantile of the population 
cannot be more than the total wealth of a richer quantile. In contrast, concentration curves, although like 
Lorenz curves always monotonically increasing (assuming there are no “negative benefits”), can be 
convex, concave, or any combination thereof. Therefore, they can also intersect the 45-degree
 line, 
leading to a more complex set of possibilities for interpreting the distribution of public service benefits 
derived from examining concentration curves. 
Figure 3, then, shows the progressivity of access to agricultural extension. With the concentration 
curves for extension lying (predominantly) above the perfect-equity line, it shows clearly that less 
wealthy households are more likely to have access to agricultural extension agents than better-off 
households. The graph also shows the mild difference in progressivity of the two most prominent modes 
of service access. DA visits to households are more oriented toward the less well-off households than is 
extension advice gained through attendance at DA community meetings. This suggests that not only is the 
incidence of extension away from the home lower for women (versus men) and spouses (versus heads), as 
previously established, but it is also lower for poorer (versus less poor) individuals. 
Table 12 presents the benefit incidence of public spending on extension by showing the share of 
the resources accruing to different wealth groups. This information is complemented by the BP odds ratio 
mapped in Figure 4—the ratio between the share of benefits accruing to a particular quintile and the share 
of this quintile in the population (see the discussion in Section 5). The share of a quintile in the population 
is of course by definition 20 percent when considering all individuals, but not necessarily so for a  
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subgroup. For example, of all women, the share of women who fall in the poorest quintile (that is, who 
falls in the group of the poorest fifth of all individuals) is not 20 percent but 28 percent. 
Table 12. Benefit incidence of public spending on agricultural extension, by gender-specific quintile 
  Q1 (poorest) 
(%)  Q2 (%)  Q3 (%)  Q4 (%)  Q5 (%)  Total 
(%) 
Based on household wealth         
All  23.73  31.50  20.87  6.83  17.07  100.00 
Women  27.58  30.96  21.85  5.18  14.42  100.00 
Men  20.25  31.46  23.27  7.35  17.66  100.00 
Based on household wealth per capita         
All  23.16  32.81  14.07  13.07  16.90  100.00 
Women  26.16  32.89  15.24  12.01  13.70  100.00 
Men  20.35  32.72  14.30  13.25  19.39  100.00 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
The results in Table 12 and Figure 4 are broadly consistent with the findings on access to 
extension represented by the concentration curves; however, they reveal some additional features in 
wealth incidence. The benefits from local public expenditures on agricultural extension are largest for the 
poorest individuals in the study area: The two poorest wealth groups benefit most substantially from 
public spending in this sector; however, the second-poorest quintile benefits from a clearly larger share of 
resources allocated to agricultural extension than that of the poorest quintile. It is also only the lowest 
three wealth groups—and in the analysis based on wealth per capita, the lowest two groups—that gain 
disproportionately to their share in the population (BP odds ratio greater than 1). The table and figure also 
show the distribution of benefits by gender. That is, they give the distribution of benefits for women by 
the wealth group that they are part of, and analogously for men. The pattern observed for all respondents 
is closely replicated when examining the gender breakdown: Women in the poorest quintiles (especially 
the second-poorest group) benefit most and at a rate greater than their presence among the female 
population. The analogous is true with respect to men. 
Figure 4. Agricultural extension benefits-to-population odds ratio, by gender-specific quintile 
Based on household wealth  Based on household wealth per capita 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey.  
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However, it is notable that the public spending benefit incidence markedly increases again for the 
highest quintile, and it does so also when examining the wealth incidence separately by gender. Thus, 
whereas the nondiscrete (and nonpublic spending–based) analysis through the concentration curves 
conveys a general picture of progressive provision of extension services, the discretized analysis of public 
spending incidence by wealth groups in Table 12 and Figure 4 highlights that the incidence is oriented 
toward the better off when examining the trends at the two ends of the wealth spectrum. 
The analysis in Table 12 does not allow for direct intergender comparison but rather examines the 
distribution of benefits within each gender (as well as within all respondents). In contrast, Table 13 
presents how agricultural extension benefits are distributed between men and women. It is perhaps not 
surprising that more of the benefits accrue to men than women. The BP odds ratio, however, is an 
important complement to the benefit shares, as the former accounts for the share of men, and of women, 
in the population (there are more women than men, as female household heads usually do not have a 
present spouse). 
Table 13. Benefit incidence of public spending on extension, by gender and headship status 
   Benefit share 
(%)  BP odds ratio 
Gender       
Women  39.22   0.732  
Men  60.78   1.309  
Total  100.00  — 
Headship status    
Spouse  26.24   0.637  
Head  73.76   1.255  
Total  100.00  — 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: BP = benefits-to-population. 
The BP odds ratio shows that men obtain 31 percent more of the benefits than would be the case 
if the public spending on extension would benefit women and men proportionately to their numbers. The 
table presents analogous analysis with respect to respondents’ headship status. The disproportionate 
benefits to heads relative to spouses is not substantially different from that in the gender distribution. 
Finally, Table 14 contrasts the average and the marginal incidence of agricultural extension 
services. As discussed in Section 5, although an economic group may benefit pronouncedly from a public 
service, the benefits it might receive if the service were expanded on the margin might be less compared 
with other economic groups. Indeed, we see distinct implications from the average and marginal odds 
ratios for agricultural extension. Specifically, although the two lowest quintiles benefit robustly from this 
service on average, the marginal incidence for these groups, while still large, is lower than the average 
incidence. This analysis suggests that the benefits the poorest groups obtain from an expansion of 
extension services are lower than what they obtain on average.  
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Table 14. Average and marginal odds ratios for agricultural extension benefits to different wealth 
groups 
     Q1 (poorest)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Total  Average odds  1.303  1.426  0.891  0.544  0.836 






    (0.138)  (0.0758)  (0.1639)  (0.3056)  (0.2493) 
Women  Average odds  1.579  1.534  0.892  0.340  0.530 
  Marginal odds  1.081
***  0.998
***  0.964
***  0.612  0.229 
    (0.0728)  (0.1028)  (0.2201)  (0.4989)  (0.2896) 
Men  Average odds  1.190  1.346  0.883  0.655  0.965 






     (0.2222)  (0.136)  (0.1376)  (0.2402)  (0.1555) 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note:
  * p < .1, 
** p < .05, 
*** p < .01. 
In contrast, the gains accruing to the third and fourth quintiles are greater at the margin than on 
average. This is also true with respect to the highest quintile for men, but not overall. Despite this 
situation, the greatest marginal incidence still accrues to the lowest-wealth group (as compared with the 
other wealth groups)—both when considering the whole sample as well as when considering each gender 
separately. In other words, while the poorest benefit the most from an expansion of the program, they 
benefit distinctly less from an expansion than they do from the services on average. The overall picture 
from this comparison of the average and marginal odds ratios in agricultural extension, then, conveys that 
an expansion would still favor the poor, albeit less than the program as a whole does.  
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7.  THE BENEFIT INCIDENCE OF PUBLIC SPENDING ON SELECTED 
COMPONENTS OF THE FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM 
We first provide core descriptive information of household survey beneficiaries of the different 
components of the FSP. There are a total of 1,118 households, of which by sample design exactly half 
(559) are in the four FSP weredas. Of these, 269 are FSP beneficiaries. Specifically, 178 are beneficiaries 
of the PW component of the PSNP, 101 are beneficiaries of the PSNP’s DS component, and only 13 
households, or 5 percent of all beneficiaries, ever received OFSP household assets or input packages.
15
To undertake a specific incidence study of the resettlement program, it is necessary to administer 
a tailored survey that traces the resettled households on the basis of administrative information from the 
FSP and then surveys them at the location of their resettled area; however, it was somewhat of a surprise 
to find that the number of OFSP recipients in the survey was so small, given the sampling methodology 
used (see Section 5). Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the OFSP versus PSNP beneficiary 
numbers in the sample with those of the country as a whole, as we were not able to obtain any conclusive 
information on the number of OFSP beneficiaries in Ethiopia (see also Section 3). Furthermore, the 
largest survey conducted to assess the impact of PSNP and OFSP—the CSA/IFPRI survey consisting of 
3,688 households, from which several studies have emerged, such as Gilligan, Hoddinott, and Seyoum 
(2009) and Gilligan et al. (2009a, 2009b) referenced earlier in this paper—has a sampling approach 
designed to be representative of the FSP’s PSNP beneficiaries, but it is not designed to be representative 
of OFSP beneficiaries, so estimates of the number of the latter cannot be discerned from that survey. 
 
Finally, only 1 household in the sample had been resettled as part of the FSP (2 other households had 
been resettled in the context of other non-FSP resettlement schemes in the country). 
In the overall incidence analysis of the program, we will treat all beneficiaries—that is, also the 
OFSP recipients—as beneficiaries. The analysis of subcomponents separately will be able to consider PW 
incidence and DS incidence, but it will not be able to examine OFSP incidence separately given the small 
sample size. 
Furthermore, it should be made explicit that the analysis focuses on the incidence of household 
transfers and does not consider how benefits from the use of the community infrastructures constructed 
under the PW component, or any medium-/large-scale infrastructure constructed under the OFSP, accrue 
to different socioeconomic groups. Although the household survey provides information on households’ 
access to, and use of, different infrastructures, it does not differentiate which of these infrastructures were 
produced through the FSP, as the information requirement to households in making these distinctions was 
considered too high for reliable reporting results to emerge from such questions. 
In light of these limitations in the scope of the FSP considered for incidence analysis, the results 
in the tables and graphs pertaining separately to subcomponents will be referred to as such, and the 
aggregate results will be referenced as “selected components of the FSP.” 
The benefit incidence of public spending on the FSP is reflected in Table 15 and Figure 5. A 
household’s beneficiary status pertains to enrollment in the program at any point in time since it was 
initiated in the household’s kebele. The first panel shows the results based on wealth groups constructed 
on household wealth, and the bottom panel on the basis of household wealth per capita. In each panel, the 
first three rows consider the spending benefit incidence of the combined selected FSP components taken 
together, the next three consider the food/cash-for-work program, and the last three consider the spending 
benefit incidence of the free food and cash aid to households. Figure 5 depicts the corresponding BP odds 
ratios, using the same scale for all six graphs for visual comparability. 
The incidence of FSP is generally pro-poor: poor households, including both FHHs and MHHs, 
receive proportionately the largest share of the public spending benefits. Forty-one percent of the 
expenditure benefits accrue to the households in the poorest quintile. Among MHHs and FHHs alone, the 
                                                       
15 As also found in the IFPRI/CSA survey (see the discussion in Section 3), in this survey, too, some households have been 
recipients of more than one FSP component).  
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equivalent share is 36 and 61 percent, respectively; however, since FHHs tend to be more concentrated in 
the poorest quintile of all households, it is once again useful to assess incidence by the BP odds ratio. In 
so doing, it is apparent that households in the poorest quintile gain from the FSP at somewhat less than 
double the rate as their population share (the ratio being higher for MHHs than for FHHs) (Figure 5). 
Table 15. Benefit incidence of public spending on the selected components of the Food Security 
Program, by gender-specific quintile (percentage) 
    Q1 (poorest)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Based on household wealth           
Selected components 
of FSP combined 
All  41.46  26.62  26.21  5.08  0.63 
FHH  60.73  9.31  26.56  3.36  0.03 
MHH  35.56  31.90  25.66  5.95  0.93 
Public works  All  49.46  37.56  10.71  2.06  0.21 
FHH  75.13  12.49  10.66  1.71  0.00 
  MHH  44.22  42.79  10.52  2.19  0.29 
Direct support  All  38.97  10.46  49.83  0.50  0.24 
FHH  46.35  3.60  49.51  0.48  0.06 
  MHH  9.87  44.84  44.45  0.51  0.33 
Based on household wealth per capita         
Selected components 
of FSP combined 
All  39.45  27.48  19.08  12.26  1.73 
FHH  60.37  9.78  11.86  14.76  3.24 
MHH  33.56  32.32  22.33  10.82  0.98 
Public works  All  47.74  37.67  8.65  5.51  0.43 
FHH  75.57  12.05  5.97  5.55  0.86 
  MHH  42.31  42.74  9.38  5.28  0.29 
Direct support  All  30.50  19.58  19.59  24.04  6.28 
FHH  39.35  10.85  14.19  28.43  7.18 
  MHH  3.14  53.14  42.97  0.30  0.45 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: FSP = Food Security Program; FHH = female-headed household; MHH = male-headed household. 
The next two panels, however, show that these pro-poor features of overall FSP incidence are 
mostly driven by the incidence of the PW component of the program, and less so by the way that public 
expenditures on the direct support program benefit different wealth groups. Although the public works 
spending incidence is decidedly pro-poor, benefits from spending on the direct support program do not 
follow any discernable pattern. The highest odds ratio overall is that of the lowest and the middle 
quintiles, and similarly, neither of the gender-disaggregated odds ratios reveals any pro-poor trend as seen 
in the PW component. The second set of panels, undertaking the spending benefit incidence on the basis 
of household wealth per capita, generally does not point in a different direction than the odds ratios based 
on household wealth: the PW incidence is successively lower for wealthier groups, whereas the DS 
incidence does not show such a trend. 
This finding may suggest that the self-targeting element of the program is relatively effective in 
reaching lower-wealth households, whereas the administrative targeting can be further improved. The 
public works program, by virtue of its requirement of hard manual labor and wage rates that may be lower 
than what the somewhat higher skilled among rural residents can obtain in alternative employment, has a 
strong self-targeting element to it in that poorer people are more likely to seek enrollment in the program. 
In contrast, the free food or cash or both provided in the direct support program has no self-targeting 
element, and thus successful targeting would need to fully rely on administrative measures.  
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Figure 5. Benefits-to-population odds ratio for selected components of the Food Security Program, 
by gender-specific quintile 
Based on HH wealth  Based on HH wealth per capita 
Selected components of FSP   
   
Public works   
   
Direct support   
   
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: HH = household; FSP = Food Security Program; FHH = female-headed household; MHH = male-headed household. 
The results also raise the question of whether the findings on incidence—in particular, the 
incidence of the DS—may arise due to the intervention’s having had the impact of raising household asset 
levels relative to those of nonbeneficiaries. This is doubtful in light of the very mixed picture of program 
impact on asset accumulation given by Gilligan et al. (2009a) and Gilligan, Hoddinott, and Seyoum 
(2009), summarized in Section 3.4 above. Granted, these two studies examined the impact only of the PW 
component and the impact of PW transfers combined with OFSP receipts. We are not aware of a similar  
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impact analysis of the DS component. However, the findings on the impact on asset growth in the above-
mentioned two papers at least do not lend confidence to the hypothesis that the DS incidence patterns may 
be a result of how this component built up beneficiaries’ assets relative to those of nonbeneficiaries. That 
said, further research into features of de facto targeting—including how the administrative and self-
targeting aspects empirically worked out in the context of the FSP—is required to speak conclusively to 
the reasons for the stronger pro-poor benefit incidence of the public works program identified here 
relative to that of the direct support program. 
Information on the relative benefits that accrue to MHHs versus FHHs shows that MHHs are 
slightly more likely to benefit from spending on the FSP as a whole than are FHHs (Table 16). This is 
true also in the case of the PW subcomponent. But the gender-specific benefit incidence of DS, very 
much in contrast, suggests that the benefit that FHHs receive far outstrips that of MHHs. 
Table 16. Benefit incidence of public spending on selected components of the Food Security 
Program, by gender of household head 
  Selected components 











FHHs  27.15  0.947  18.45  0.644  79.38  2.768 
MHHs  72.85  1.021  81.55  1.143  20.62  0.289 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: FSP = Food Security Program; BP = benefits-to-population; FHH = female-headed household; MHH = male-headed 
household. 
It is useful to contrast the incidence of the FSP captured through household participation in and 
public spending on the program, as discussed above, with incidence measured by the monetary value of 
in-kind and cash receipts by households. The latter is summarized in Table 17, which shows the per capita 
cumulative value that households received from the start of the program in their community to 2000EC. 
The pro-poor nature of the PW component is clearly reflected not only in the public spending benefits 
distribution but also in the value of beneficiaries’ receipts: average per capita transfer values are lower in 
successively higher-wealth groups. 
Table 17. Incidence of household receipts from selected components of the Food Security Program, 
by quintile and gender of the household head (birr) 
  Based on household wealth    Based on household wealth per capita 
   Selected 





  Selected 





Total  357.20  306.24  348.26             
Q1 (poorest)  386.06  353.79  332.79    343.27  322.76  276.58 
Q2  332.33  296.51  222.66    340.46  307.21  242.38 
Q3  324.72  277.87  303.02    330.18  277.18  302.87 
Q4  356.41  192.25  411.13    363.30  314.56  376.33 
Q5  494.06  148.00  518.77     560.23  310.00  591.51 
FHH  410.00  294.92  371.31         
MHH  333.09  309.87  325.22             
Head–gender gap  1.231  0.952  1.142         
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: The distinction between results based on wealth and wealth per capita only applies to the wealth incidence of receipts. 
comp. = component; FSP = Food Security Program; FHH = female-headed household; MHH = male-headed household.  
The same is not true with respect to the DS component, where there is an approximate trend of 
greater transfers to higher-wealth households. As a result, overall transfer values through the program  
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increase with wealth, with the exception of the lowest quintile, which goes against this trend, as average 
transfers to the poorest group are greater than the overall average transfer value. The picture that emerges 
from the alternative measure of wealth per capita does not improve the distribution of transfers: the 
magnitude of PW transfers is approximately flat with respect to wealth groups, and DS transfers are 
inversely related to household wealth per capita. 
There is less consistency between results on the gender incidence of the program when comparing 
the public spending incidence and the incidence of household receipts among beneficiaries. Although 
FHHs gain strongly disproportionately in terms of participation in the direct support program, the 
magnitude of cash and in-kind benefits that FHHs receive is somewhat smaller than that of MHHs. 
Figure 6 undertakes a less discretized view of the incidence of access to, and receipts from, the 
program through concentration curves, allowing us to compare the progressivity of these two aspects of 
the intervention. The concentration curves for the PW component (thin curves) show that although both 
measures of the program (participation and receipts) reflect that it is generally targeted to the less well off, 
the distribution of the receipts among beneficiaries tends to be slightly more progressive than general 
access to (participation in) the program is. To interpret the comparison between the concentration curves 
on the left and the right, consider that if each participating household were to receive the exact same PW 
transfer value, then the left and right PW concentration curves would be identical. Thus, the slightly 
stronger upward and leftward bulge of the receipts distribution of public works (PW curve in the right-
hand graph) is the result of the generally larger amount received by poorer beneficiaries relative to the 
better-off beneficiaries. 
Figure 6. Concentration curves for the distribution of selected components of the Food Security 
Program 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: comp. = component; FSP = Food Security Program.  
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The reverse is true with regard to the DS concentration curves (darker curves). The participation 
curve on the left shows a neither unambiguously progressive nor regressive distribution, but the clearly 
regressive receipts curve suggests that better-off beneficiaries tend to receive greater amounts than less-
well-off beneficiaries. Both participation in and receipts from the program as a whole are progressive, and 
comparing the left and right FSP curves suggests that incidence just among the beneficiaries depicts 
neither progressivity nor regressivity (since the receipts-concentration curve approximately follows the 
participation curve, that is, is neither to the left/above it nor to the right/below it). 
It is also of interest to consider program incidence with the distribution of wealth itself. The 
incidence of the program as a whole, as well as of its two major components, has a more equitable 
distribution than the distribution of wealth itself. This is true whether one considers incidence in terms of 
participation in the program or the value of receipts gained from the program. Thus, for example, 
although receipts from direct support accrue at higher rates to the better off, the degree of inequality in 
benefits from the direct support program is still lower than the degree of wealth inequality. 
Finally, the lower two graphs of Figure 6 repeat this analysis; however, they include only the four 
food-insecure weredas. The fact that after exclusion of the FSP weredas all concentration curves are 
generally to the right and below their upper panel counterparts suggests that households in the non-FSP 
weredas are indeed higher wealth, as distribution of access across all weredas is more progressive than 
across only the weredas designated food-insecure. 
Table 18 presents the average and marginal incidence of the FSP. As was also seen in the 
analogous comparison in the case of agricultural extension, on average poor households benefit more 
from the FSP than they would from a marginal expansion of the program. In contrast, overall, the best-off 
households gain slightly more from a further rollout of the FSP than they do from the program on 
average. Comparing the relative gains across quintiles, however, both the average and the marginal odds 
of access to the FSP are highest for the poorest quintiles, when considering all households. This is also 
true for MHHs but not for FHHs. 
Table 18. Average and marginal odds ratio for benefits from selected components of the Food 
Security Program, accruing to different wealth groups 
     Q1 (poorest)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Total  Average odds  1.418  1.317  1.361  0.659  0.246 






    (0.1443)  (0.1217)  (0.0984)  (0.1599)  (0.2768) 
FHH  Average odds  0.924  0.913  1.626  0.868  0.164 
  Marginal odds  0.771
***  0.849
***  1.114
***  1.044  0.312 
    (0.2356)  (0.2264)  (0.1129)  (0.198)  (0.2189) 
MHH  Average odds  1.697  1.497  1.237  0.629  0.280 






     (0.2283)  (0.1312)  (0.1188)  (0.1692)  (0.2758) 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: FHH = female-headed household; MHH = male-headed household. 
* p < .1; 
** p < .05; 
*** p < .01.  
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8.  THE BENEFIT INCIDENCE OF DRINKING WATER SUPPLY 
Public expenditure on the drinking water supply in rural areas is primarily in the purview of the regions. 
There are wereda water desks at the local level—most of which are a unit within the WoARD—but they 
are predominantly responsible for supporting the region in implementing water facility construction and 
providing technical assistance to water committees. In light of this, the Wereda/City Benchmarking 
Survey did not include in its questionnaire information on public spending on drinking water for rural 
weredas (but did so for municipalities). Thus, this analysis will be confined to the benefit incidence of 
drinking water supply that does not account for the cost dimension of provision of this service but 
examines the differential access to water by wealth and gender categories of households. 
We follow the conceptualization of “access” to drinking water discussed in Section 4. One 
dimension is the physical access, represented by households’ distance to water sites, which invariably has 
implications for the amount of water a household is able to obtain. The other dimension is quality, which 
we assess by looking at the extent to which households draw on safe water sources. 
Table 19 reflects the first dimension. It shows that it takes households approximately one hour to 
fetch water for one trip—somewhat less during the rainy season and somewhat more in the dry season, 
when some water sources may not be available. The differentiation across wealth groups does not reveal a 
clear relationship between physical access to water and wealth. 
Table 19. Physical access to water: Distance to water source (minutes) 
   Total  Q1 (poorest)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Based on household wealth             
Primary source in 
dry season 
One way  25.25  22.55  24.94  32.79  25.43  20.86 
Full trip  65.15  54.98  62.79  86.52  66.37  55.88 
Primary source in 
wet season 
One way  20.98  20.73  21.22  26.08  19.77  17.35 
Full trip  53.05  50.37  53.48  66.08  51.30  44.76 
Based on household wealth per capita           
Primary source in 
dry season 
One way    22.93  25.41  30.02  23.14  24.80 
Full trip    55.80  63.64  80.32  62.95  63.12 
Primary source in 
wet season 
One way    20.84  21.27  24.16  18.25  20.46 
Full trip    50.71  53.07  62.47  48.42  50.81 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Table 20 presents various measures of access to safe drinking water. The survey has detailed 
information on the sources of water a household uses. The categorization of water sources as improved 
and unimproved sources follows the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and 
Sanitation.
16
The table indicates that there are in fact only very small differences by these two dimensions. 
Thirty-seven percent and 38 percent of households use as their primary source an improved source in the 
dry and wet seasons, respectively, and 36 percent consistently access safe water as their primary source 
throughout the year. The share of households that exclusively access safe water in the dry season, rainy 
season, and throughout the year is markedly lower, by about 10 percentage points, respectively. 
 As different sources will be available in the two seasons, we consider the availability of safe 
sources separately by season. We also consider the use of improved sources as the primary source drawn 
on by the household (possibly combined with occasional use of unimproved water as an alternate source) 
versus the exclusive use of safe water. 
                                                       
16 An electronic version of the guidelines can be found at <http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions/infrastructure.html>.  
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Table 20. Access to safe drinking water (percentage) 
      Total  Q1 (poorest)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Based on household wealth           
Safe primary 
source in: 
Dry season  37.05  53.16  45.31  43.01  22.28  23.12 
Wet season  38.08  53.16  44.79  41.40  25.74  26.63 
Both seasons  35.71  53.16  43.75  39.78  21.78  21.61 
Safe: all sources 
used in: 
Dry season  25.81  30.11  31.05  30.56  17.41  20.92 
Wet season  26.30  29.95  31.58  27.72  19.60  23.23 
Both seasons  24.53  29.41  29.32  27.17  17.41  20.10 
Based on household wealth per capita           
Safe primary 
source in: 
Dry season  37.05  56.91  41.45  37.70  27.27  23.12 
Wet season  38.08  56.91  41.45  37.70  30.30  25.13 
Both seasons  35.71  56.91  40.41  35.08  25.76  21.61 
Safe: all sources 
used in: 
Dry season  25.81  31.35  29.63  27.96  19.90  20.81 
Wet season  26.30  32.26  29.10  26.60  22.16  21.89 
Both seasons  24.53  30.65  27.89  25.40  18.88  20.40 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Unlike when capturing water supply incidence through the physical access measures, in this case 
of a measure relating to water quality, there are more pronounced differences by wealth groups. And quite 
strikingly, the incidence is clearly highest for the poorest group of households, no matter which measure 
of access to safe water is considered. The lower the quintile, the higher the incidence of improved water 
access (except for the least poor quintile). How surprising these results are, however, is uncertain given 
that there have been no extensive benefit incidence analyses of water services in prior literature, though 
other incidence analyses in Uganda, Bolivia, and Nicaragua have found public water services to be 
poverty neutral (Wokadala, Magidu, and Guloba 2010; Ajwad and Wodon 2007; Pradhan and Rawlings 
2002). The progressive incidence of safe water access in our results is also reflected in the mapping of the 
distribution as concentration curves (Figure 7). As the lower panel of Table 20 shows, this trend is more 
pronounced when households are classified on the basis of their per capita wealth rather than their total 
wealth. 
Figure 7. Concentration curves for access to safe water 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey.  
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Finally, the results comparing marginal and average wealth incidence of safe drinking water 
access (Table 21) suggest that unlike the analogous analysis for the other two programs,  generally 
speaking there is not a large discrepancy between how wealth groups would benefit from this service on 
average and on the margin if the services were to expand. 
Table 21. Average and marginal odds in improved drinking water access 
      Q1 (poorest)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Total  Average odds  1.489  1.225  1.114  0.610  0.605 






    (0.2184)  (0.2477)  (0.24)  (0.2952)  (0.2441) 
FHH  Average odds  1.244  0.989  0.854  0.604  0.980 
  Marginal odds  0.499
***  1.743
***  -1.390
***  0.489  1.258 
    (0.5146)  (0.6234)  (0.692)  (0.3916)  (0.4389) 
MHH  Average odds  1.501  1.319  1.217  0.631  0.593 






      (0.2983)  (0.2391)  (0.2463)  (0.3083)  (0.353) 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: The average and marginal incidences are estimated for access to improved sources as the primary source, in both dry and 
wet seasons. FHH = female-headed household; MHH = male-headed household. 
* p < .1; 
** p < .05; 
*** p < .01. 
Although the lowest-wealth group benefits somewhat less from program expansion than from the 
program on average, the average and marginal benefits for the other wealth groups are about the same. 
The wealth group that is the greatest benefactor on average is the poorest quintile—and this is true in the 
aggregate as well as when considering male- and female-headed households separately. The wealth group 
that tends to benefit the most on the margin, although not the poorest, is still the second poorest quintile. 
Table 22 summarizes the earlier discussed two dimensions of water access for each of the study 
weredas. It is not surprising that households in the relatively arid Telalak spend by far the most time 
fetching water. The wereda (Ibantu in the west of Oromia) for which the time spent fetching water is 
lowest also has by far the lowest incidence of use of improved sources, likely due to the abundant 
existence of natural (unimproved) water sources. Households in Ofla have the best access to safe water 
sources overall, and among the highest rates of improved water use as a primary source. In the study 
wereda in Gambella, water sources of households are highly diversified, explaining the fact that although 
a high percentage use facilities providing safe water as their primary source, a rather low percentage rely 
exclusively on improved sources. 
Table 22. Access to and quality of drinking water, by wereda 
Wereda 
Access to improved water in both 
seasons (%)    Distance to primary 
source in dry season 
(round trip, 
minutes)  Primary source  All water sources   
Bati (Amhara)  58.77  30.09    70.4 
Gog (Gambella)  56.30  13.43    64.1 
Ibantu (Oromia)  4.69  4.72    39.2 
Ofla (Tigray)  52.43  53.00    48.5 
Sekota (Amhara)  38.66  36.44    49.9 
Sheko (SNNP)  11.36  8.40    38.8 
Telalak (Afar)  28.18  19.09    183.7 
Yaso (Beneshangul-Gumuz)  39.53  38.46    40.4 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: SNNP = Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples.  
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The value of considering the two distinct measures of access to drinking water is particularly well 
revealed in the results shown in Table 23. The gender discrepancy in the two sets of measures actually 
points in different directions. FHHs are more likely to be located further away from their primary water 
source than are MHHs.  However, a distinctly greater share of FHHs than MHHs use safe water sources. 
Half of the FHHs rely on safe sources as their main water source, in contrast to a third of MHHs. If 
indeed safe water sources tend to be located at a greater distance than unimproved sources, this finding is 
less inconsistent than it may initially seem. These results, in any case, may have quite different 
implications about the gendered nature of access to water, depending on how one measures access.
17
Table 23. Gender incidence of water supply 
 
      FHH  MHH  Head–gender gap 
Physical access to drinking water (minutes)    
Primary source in 
dry season 
One way  29.0  24.3  1.196 
Full trip  73.5  62.9  1.169 
Primary source in 
wet season 
One way  25.1  19.9  1.264 
Full trip  62.8  50.4  1.245 
Use of safe drinking water (percentage)    
Primary source in: 
Dry season  49.51  33.73  1.468 
Wet season  48.53  35.29  1.375 
Both seasons  48.04  32.42  1.482 
All sources used 
in: 
Dry season  29.56  24.80  1.192 
Wet season  29.56  25.43  1.162 
Both seasons  28.08  23.58  1.191 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: FHH = female-headed household; MHH = male-headed household. 
It appears, then, that not only are women responsible for undertaking the work required to access 
this service but also that FHHs are more willing than MHHs to invest in the effort (and cost) to access 
safe water from facilities instead of relying on unimproved natural water sources. This may well be due to 
women’s predominant responsibility for caring for children, and thus their greater awareness of the health 
problems contaminated water causes especially for children (as discussed in Section 4). Our result may be 
related to the fact that female household heads are likely in a better position than wives of male household 
heads to make household decisions about whether the financial and time cost should be incurred to use 
water from facilities. 
These results on the gender incidence of improved water use contrast markedly with the gender 
features of community drinking water management in the study weredas. Of the water committees 
surveyed in the eight weredas, 92 percent are headed by men, and a still high 76 percent of all water 
committee members are male. The qualitative research confirmed this finding that local drinking water 
management tends to be heavily male dominated—though there was at least one woman on the 
committee. This gender imbalance on water committees stands in contrast to the chore of fetching water, 
which is predominantly a woman’s and children’s task. It is women who have the keenest awareness of 
any challenges pertaining to the distance of facilities, quality of the water, problems with reliability and 
quantity of water from facilities, and any issues with how payment for water is administered; thus, women 
should arguably have a better representation in community management of water than their extent of 
involvement found in the qualitative research, as well as in the quantitative survey of water committees. 
The qualitative research also identified serious challenges with water committees’ ability to 
engage with water users in the community to encourage them to undertake timely payments as per the 
                                                       
17 The survey asked respondents the more detailed questions on water source (including distance to the source and time 
spent waiting to collect water at the source) only with regard to respondents’ primary sources. Thus, it is unfortunately not 
possible to compare distance to sources households use versus distance to sources they do not primarily use or do not use at all.  
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terms of water use, or to contribute labor to maintaining the water systems. Water committee members 
and leaders reported that they received no training on community relations, and whatever training they got 
tended to focus only on the technical aspects of facility management. They also pointed to limited support 
from the wereda water desk; and finding themselves in a bind between poor support from above and 
inability to ensure contributions from the community for facility upkeep, the facilities have become 
nonfunctional. In several cases, the water committees themselves had de facto disbanded. The qualitative 
fieldwork also showed that households in several sites were relatively quick to resort back to unimproved 
surface water as soon as there was a problem with the facility. This ready exit option for users makes the 
overall functioning of improved water service provision all the more difficult, as users are not compelled 
to seek to hold water committees accountable for their management of facilities. 
Generally, the sites visited in Ofla tended to be an exception to this somewhat bleak picture of 
community water management; here the interface between water committee and users appeared to 
function better, and the women’s association head interviewed had been very assertive in holding the 
water committee to account for shortcomings she perceived. At this site, however, water service was not 
without its problems; community members raised issues with fairness regarding the requirement to 
contribute money and labor toward facility construction, comparing their cost arrangements with those of 
neighboring communities; however, at least the engagement with the water committee was vigorous, even 
if unresolved complaints remained.  
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9.  WHICH DEMAND- AND SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH 
ACCESS TO THESE PUBLIC SERVICES? 
Sections 6 through 8 offered an analysis of the benefit incidence of public investments in the three 
sectors/programs of central interest in this study—agricultural extension, water supply, and selected 
components of the FSP. The undertaking above offered a picture of how these public investments reach 
different socioeconomic groups. In this section, we take one step further and go beyond incidence 
analysis to examine how supply- and demand-side factors are associated with households’ and 
individuals’ access to these services—including the factors of particular interest in the preceding analysis, 
namely, gender and wealth. 
The motivation for the regression analysis is to buttress the findings of previous sections with 
regard to gender and wealth variables, as well as to identify additional variables that are correlated with 
access. In doing so, we can better understand the pathways by which the provision of rural services occurs 
and which demand- and supply-side variables are correlated with this provision. It is important to note 
that although regression analysis is used in this section, causality is not implied by the results, nor is it 
sought. Issues related to endogeneity limit the interpretation of these regression results to correlations, not 
causality. Nonetheless, the results here serve as a useful first step in identifying important variables and in 
later modeling of access to these services. 
The consideration of supply- and demand-side factors in affecting access to services is motivated 
by a broader framework of the forces that ultimately determine public service quantity, quality, and 
equity. This framework is summarized in Figure 8. Generally, elements of the different reform measures 
undertaken by the government and the large-scale programs supported by the donor community to 
provide public services can be categorized into demand-side approaches (increasing citizens’ ability to 
demand better services) and supply-side approaches (improving the incentives and capacity of the 
administration to supply better services). Effective demand-side mechanisms improve citizen voice and 
public accountability; they strengthen the ability of citizens to articulate their heterogeneous values and 
preferences and to hold public representatives and officials accountable to meeting these needs through 
the efficient and fair use of public resources. Demand-side mechanisms rely on (or seek to create) both an 
empowered, vocal citizenry and downwardly accountable public representatives. Examples of efforts 
undertaken on the demand side in Ethiopia’s decentralization process include the transparency of the 
budget processes component and the social accountability component of the Protection of Basic Services 
project. 
Supply-side mechanisms build the capacity of the public administration to efficiently, equitably, 
and honestly perform its tasks, which include providing services and infrastructure, providing effective 
regulation, and ensuring the rule of law and access to justice. Public sector capacity is influenced by the 
availability and management of the many types of resources necessary “to get the job done” (for example, 
time, funds, information, and technical and managerial expertise); the structure of incentives that shape a 
will for public responsiveness; and the existence of “horizontal accountability,” or formal relationships of 
authority and supervision among agents of the state. Examples of donor-supported supply-side efforts in 
the Ethiopian context include the National Capacity Building Program, the Public Sector Capacity 
Building Program, the Capacity Building for Service Delivery project, and the resource transfer through 
the government’s block grant system of the Protection of Basic Services project. The introduction of 
gender desks is a supply-side measure that seeks to improve gender equity. 
The framework displayed in Figure 8 shows that the performance of service delivery depends on 
the “fit” of demand- and supply-side factors with context-specific conditions. On the demand side, these 
conditions encompass the socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of local communities, including 
gender roles and social structure. In Ethiopia, one can expect that these characteristics differ among ethnic 
and religious groups. The effectiveness of supply-side measures depends on the extent to which they 
actually address the prevailing problems in the public administration. The framework also points to the 
fact that supply- and demand-side measures need to be well coordinated. Obviously, improving the  
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demand side of local governance has little effect if the public administration lacks the capacity and 
incentives to respond, for example. Figure 8 also indicates that reforming governance at both the demand 
side and the supply side is a political process, and both the design and the implementation of demand- and 
supply-side measures are subject to political economy factors. 


























Source: Authors’ compilation. 
The framework illustrated in Figure 8 is intentionally devised very broadly, so as to illustrate and 
capture the big picture of demand- and supply-side processes that would contribute toward public service 
outcomes. In so doing, the framework offers a very rich array for empirical application—in fact, an array 
rich enough to warrant several distinct studies. For example, it may be interesting, but it would go well 
beyond the scope of this paper, to discuss the extent to which the above-mentioned government- and 
donor-supported reform strategies to improve demand- and supply-side processes have or have not been 
successful. To stay within the scope of this research, we focus on the right half of the framework depicted 
in Figure 8 and consider immediate indicators of supply- and demand-side factors for the three services of 
interest, where applicable (that is, selected immediate indicators and outcomes associated with the thick 
boxes in the figure), as well as some indicators of sociocultural factors (the uppermost box in the figure). 
Table 24 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the subsequent analysis. Since 
the agricultural extension models are at the individual level and the water services and FSP models are at 
the household level, the means and standard deviations for the variables used are reported at the level at 
which they are used in the analysis.
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Table 24. Description and summary statistics for variables 
 
Variable  Description 
Household level    Respondent level 
  Mean  Std. dev.    Mean  Std. dev. 
1  Access to improved drinking 
water 
Household uses an improved water source as its 
primary source in both dry and wet seasons 
0.357  0.479      
2  Access to extension services  Respondent has received agricultural extension 
services in the past 1 year 
      0.354  0.478 
3  Beneficiary of selected 
components of the FSP 
HH has ever been beneficiary of HH transfers 
made via the public works, direct support, or 
“Other FSP” components of the FSP 
0.237  0.425      
4  Beneficiary of public works  HH has ever been beneficiary of HH transfers 
made via the public works component of the 
FSP 
0.159  0.366      
5  Beneficiary of direct 
support 
HH has ever been beneficiary of HH transfers 
made via the direct support component of the 
FSP 
0.090  0.287      
6  Number of water facilities in 
kebele 
Number of water facilities existent in the kebele 
in which HH resides 
2.251  3.014      
7  Number of DAs in kebele  Number of DAs assigned to the kebele in which 
respondent resides 
      2.342  1.755 
8  DA coverage of gotts  Share of all gotts in the kebele of the 
respondent’s residence that is covered by one 
DA 
      0.652  0.402 
9  Health extension for HH  Either head or spouse was visited by health 
extension worker in past year 
0.150  0.357      
10 Health extension for woman 
in HH 
Woman (whether head or spouse) was visited by 
health extension worker in past year 
0.122  0.328      
11 Member of a cooperative  Respondent is a member of an agricultural 
cooperative 
      0.119  0.324 
12 Number of high social 
contacts 
Number of people in local leadership positions 
with whom respondent had had contact in past 
year 
3.399  2.248      
13 Number of high social 
contacts (excluding DAs) 
As #12, but not considering contacts with Das        1.682  2.109 
14 Number of high social 
contacts (excluding WC) 
As #12, but not considering contacts with water 
committee leaders/members 
3.275  2.142       
15 Social leadership  Either head or spouse (respondent) is or used to 
be in local leadership position 
0.237  0.425    0.141  0.348 
16 Access to media  Uses a mass media source once or more times a 
week 
0.326  0.469    0.186  0.389 
17 Education  Years of education  2.038  3.004    1.427  2.629 
18 Education of woman  Years of education of woman in the HH 
(whether head or spouse) 
0.593  1.693      
19 Assets  Value of all HH physical assets (livestock, 




56.583      
20 Assets per capita   Value of HH physical assets per capita (‘000 
birr) 
9.985  12.246      
21 Land  HH owns land  0.839  0.368      
22 Improved housing  House’s walls are made of improved materials: 
wood, iron sheets, and/or bamboo 
0.234  0.424      
23 Gender  Head (respondent) is male  0.790  0.407    0.458  0.498 
24 Age  Age of head (respondent)  43.289  14.949    39.54
4 
14.177 
25 Household size  Number of HH members  5.747  2.486      
26 Number of working-age HH 
members 
Number of HH members between the ages of 15 
and 65 
2.811  1.470      
27 Number of children and 
women 
Number of children in the HH under the age of 
12 and women under the age of 50 
3.924  2.061      
28 Afar  Ethnic group of head (respondent)is Afar  0.126  0.332      
29 Anuak  Ethnic group of head (respondent) is Anuak  0.122  0.327    0.110  0.313  
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Table 24. Continued 
 
Variable  Description 
Household level    Respondent level 
  Mean  Std. dev.    Mean  Std. dev. 
30 Oromo  Ethnic group of head (respondent) is Oromo  0.274  0.446    0.280  0.449 
31 Tigraian  Ethnic group of head (respondent) is Tigraian  0.145  0.352    0.130  0.337 
32 Muslim  Religion of head (respondent) is Muslim  0.280  0.449    0.263  0.440 
33 Orthodox  Religion of head (respondent) is Orthodox 
Christian 
0.402  0.491    0.382  0.486 
34 Protestant  Religion of head (respondent) is Protestant  0.363  0.481    0.320  0.467 
35 Food-insecure area  Respondent resides in an FSP wereda: Bati, 
Ofla, Sekota, or Telalak 
      0.464  0.499 
36 Bati  Household (respondent) resides in Bati  0.117  0.322    0.125  0.331 
37 Gog  Household (respondent) resides in Gog  0.139  0.346    0.114  0.318 
38 Ibantu  Household (respondent) resides in Ibantu  0.134  0.340    0.140  0.347 
39 Ofla  Household (respondent) resides in Ofla  0.106  0.308    0.115  0.319 
40 Sekota  Household (respondent) resides in Sekota  0.122  0.328    0.123  0.332 
41 Sheko  Household (respondent) resides in Sheko  0.136  0.343    0.134  0.340 
42 Telalak  Household (respondent) resides in Telalak  0.113  0.317    0.109  0.312 
43 Yaso  Household (respondent) resides in Yaso  0.134  0.340    0.136  0.343 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: Std. dev. = standard deviation; HH = household; FSP = Food Security Program; DA = development agent; WC = water 
committee. 
Table 25 first considers the supply- and demand-side correlates of access to agricultural 
extension. It is perhaps not surprising that the extent of supply of a service clearly matters for households’ 
likelihood of uptake of the service. After controlling for the wereda in which individuals reside, having a 
greater number of DAs in one’s kebele is associated with greater likelihood of receiving extension 
services. However, for a given number of DAs, higher coverage of gotts (villages) by DAs does not imply 
that on average individuals are more likely to receive extension services. On the contrary, the results 
suggest robustly that the greater (territorial) coverage in the kebele that DAs achieve, the lower the 
probability of the average kebele resident’s receiving extension. 
This situation may arise from high transaction costs of achieving coverage; in Ethiopia many DAs 
travel by foot to farm households, so greater coverage may come at the cost of fewer households visited 
in a given amount of time. In fact, anecdotal evidence from field visits in the context of this research 
project showed that despite the policy that each DA (who has specific individual expertise in crop, 
livestock, or natural resources management) is to serve households across the kebele specifically in that 
area of specialization, in several cases DAs in a kebele actually arrange to allocate gotts among 
themselves; each DA then serves only his or her gotts and addresses issues both within and outside the 
individual’s specialization as helpfully as possible for households in these gotts. The discussion with the 
DAs who are undertaking such arrangements suggested that this situation is due to the time inefficiency 
of each DA covering all gotts. 
Whereas the base model controls for location of respondents in weredas, one of the alternative 
specifications, Model 3, considers location by food-secure versus food-insecure weredas rather than 
including wereda effects. It is apparent that residents of weredas designated as food-insecure (as per the 
designation for the FSP) are significantly more likely to access extension services; here, being in a food-
insecure wereda is associated with a 20 percent greater probability of access to the service. A possible 
supply-side placement decision could be driving this: One of the features of the FSP is the provision of 
subsidized input packages, including extension provision on the use of the packages, as discussed in 
Section 3. That is, the OFSP effectively includes agricultural extension services. However, as noted in the 
description of the FSP-related data, our sample found only a very small share of FSP beneficiaries 
receiving OFSP packages, so it remains inconclusive whether the OFSP is the primary reason for this 
result. 
The results also point to a strong association of extension access with access to complementary 
services, for example, to services of cooperatives. Being a cooperative member is associated with an  
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approximately 20 percent higher probability of receiving agricultural extension. In Ethiopia agricultural 
cooperatives, though in principle often multipurpose, very often have the role of facilitating the purchase 
of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer, by their members. This strong association is consistent with the 
reality that agricultural advice is commonly centered on encouraging farmers’ adoption of agricultural 
input packages, and that thus cooperative and extension services are highly complementary to each other. 
At the core of this study is the benefit incidence of public services on different wealth groups,  on 
women versus men, and on FHHs versus MHHs; the findings on the incidence of extension are detailed in 
Section 6. When controlling for a range of factors in the regression analysis in Table 25, including 
controlling for wereda location of respondents—that is, in all but Models 2 and 3—household wealth is 
not statistically significantly related to access to extension. However, without considering locational 
effects, a negative relationship to physical assets emerges, consistent with the findings of the earlier 
incidence analysis. The same obtains with another indicator of household wealth, namely, quality of 
housing. 
Table 25. Access to extension services 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
Supply-side factors                  
Number of DAs in kebele  .0261
**  (.0112)  –.0253
***  (.0084)  –.0157
*  (.0087)  .0257
**  (.0111) 
DA coverage of gotts  -.1170
***  (.0348)  –.1831
***  (.0310)  –.1579
***  (.0317)  –.1209
***  (.0345) 
Food-insecure area            .1938
***  (.0491)     
Demand-side factors:             
Access to complementary services                   
Member of a cooperative  .2071
***  (.0466)  .2093
***  (.0438)  .2028
***  (.0440)  .2080
***  (.0465) 
Household wealth                      
Assets  .0004  (.0003)  –.0009
***  (.0003)  –.0004  (.0003)  .0005  (.0003) 
Land  –.0211  (.0413)  .0985
***  (.0382)  .1115
***  (.0383)  –.0240  (.0410) 
Higher-quality housing  –.0214  (.0335)  –.0922
***  (.0276)  –.0593
**  (.0298)  –.0208  (.0335) 
Human capital, vertical social capital, and information         
Number of high social contacts 
(excl. DA)  .0468
***  (.0081)  .0382
***  (.0078)  .0397
***  (.0079)  .0480
***  (.0081) 
Access to media  .0923
**  (.0368)  .1035
***  (.0367)  .1079
***  (.0369)  .0909
**  (.0367) 
Education  –.0074  (.0052)  –.0081  (.0053)  –.0066  (.0053)  –.0064  (.0052) 
Other respondent characteristics                   
Household and respondent demographics                
Gender  .1214
***  (.0379)  .0548  (.0365)  .0438  (.0365)  .1166
***  (.0378) 
Age   .0142
***  (.0049)  .0169
***  (.0051)  .0157
***  (.0051)  .0138
***  (.0049) 
Age-sq.  –0002
***  (.0001)  –.0002
***  (.0001)  –.0002
***  (.0001)  –.0002
***  (.0001) 
Household size  .0060  (.0057)  .0025  (.0057)  .0043  (.0057)  .0061  (.0057) 
Social group affiliation (ethnicity and religion)              
Oromo  –.1268
**  (.0627)  –.0281  (.0337)  –.0157  (.0343)     
Tigraian  .0469  (.1023)  .3496
***  (.0455)  .2730
***  (.0513)     
Anuak  –.0681  (.1721)  .1468
***  (.0533)  .2066
***  (.0557)     
Protestant  .1184
*  (.0698)  .0728  (.0696)  .0725  (.0700)  .1057  (.0694) 
Orthodox  .0687  (.0707)  .1200
*  (.0708)  .0704  (.0721)  .0618  (.0703) 
Muslim  .1445  (.1006)  –.0494  (.0706)  –.1721
**  (.0694)  .1423  (.1007) 
Location effects                     
Bati  -.2185
***  (.0661)            –.2857
***  (.0368) 
Gog  –.1364  (.1425)            –.1852
***  (.0428) 
Ibantu  -.2900
***  (.0457)            –.3411
***  (.0253) 
Ofla  –.0217  (.1044)            .0219  (.0603) 
Sheko  -.3193
***  (.0268)            –.3235
***  (.0260) 
Telalak  -.4175
***  (.0176)            –.4201
***  (.0175) 
Yaso  -.2942
***  (.0296)            –.3058
***  (.0273) 
Number of observations  1,885     1,885     1,885     1,885    
pseudo-R
2  .2597     .2005     .2068     .2579    
Log-likelihood  –907.7     –98.2     –972.5     –909.8    
LR χ
2  636.71    491.74    507.12    632.48   
P-value  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    
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Table 25. Continued 
  (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)  
Supply-side factors                  
Number of DAs in kebele  .0242
**  (.0111)  .0242
**  (.0110)  .0267
**  (.0112)  .0284
**  (.0111) 
DA coverage of gotts  –.1159
***  (.0342)  –.1187
***  (.0339)  –1184
***  (.0348)  –1204
***  (.0347) 
Demand-side factors                  
Access to complementary services                     
Member of a cooperative  .2065
***  (.0465)  .2071
***  (.0464)  .2082
***  (.0466)  .2037
***  (.0465) 
Household wealth                        
Assets  .0004  (.0003)  .0004  (.0003)      .0003  (.0003) 
Assets per capita              .0005  (.0014)       
Land  –.0193  (.0412)  –.0215  (.0410)  –.0220  (.0413)  .0616  (.0383) 
Higher-quality housing  –.0263  (.0332)  –.0251  (.0332)  –.0213  (.0335)  .0005  (.0339) 
Human capital, vertical social capital, and information               
Number of high social 
contacts (excl. DA)  .0469
***  (.0081)  .0480
***  (.0081)  .0468
***  (.0081)      
Social leadership                  .0769
**  (.0384) 
Access to media  .0952
***  (.0366)  .0940
***  (.0365)  .0949
***  (.0368)  .1203
***  (.0367) 
Education  –.0067  (.0052)  –.0060  (.0051)  –.0075  (.0052)  –.0056  (.0052) 
Other respondent characteristics                  
Household and respondent demographics                  
Gender  .1164
***  (.0378)  .1121
***  (.0377)  .1210
***  (.0379)  .1513
***  (.0373) 
Age   .0137
***  (.0049)  .0135
***  (.0049)  .0145
***  (.0049)  .0162
***  (.0049) 
Age-sq.  –.0002
***  (.0001)  –.0002
***  (.0001)  -.0002
***  (.0001)  -.0002
***  (.0001) 
Household size  .0056  (.0057)  .0056  (.0057)  .0075  (.0059)  .0049  (.0057) 
Social group affiliation (ethnicity and religion)                  
Oromo  –.1198
*  (.0632)        –.1319
**  (.0622)  –.1554
**  (.0607) 
Tigraian  .0461  (.1020)        .0491  (.1025)  .0413  (.1024) 
Anuak  –.0376  (.1799)        –.0816  (.1674)  –.1109  (.1540) 
Protestant              .1203
*  (.0697)  .1295
*  (.0697) 
Orthodox              .0705  (.0706)  .0681  (.0704) 
Muslim              .1442  (.1006)  .1294  (.0993) 
Location effects                       
Bati  –.1751
***  (.0586)  –.2493
***  (.0265)  -.2128
***  (.0678)  -.2027
***  (.0705) 
Gog  –.1365  (.1428)  –.1668
***  (.0411)  –.1280  (.1458)  –.0784  (.1596) 
Ibantu  –.2742
***  (.0480)  –.3290
***  (.0250)  -.2778
***  (.0480)  -.2934
***  (.0452) 
Ofla  –.0098  (.1059)  .0324  (.0606)  –.0262  (.1038)  –.0287  (.1039) 
Sheko  –.3046
***  (.0273)  –.3101
***  (.0264)  -.3127
***  (.0279)  -.2971
***  (.0298) 
Telalak  –.4079
***  (.0152)  –.4100
***  (.0152)  -.4157
***  (.0176)  -.4067
***  (.0174) 
Yaso  –.2885
***  (.0289)  –.3004
***  (.0267)  -.2854
***  (.0307)  -.3103
***  (.0274) 
Number of observation  1,885     1,885     1,885     1,885    
pseudo-R
2  .2578     .2563     .2592     .2473    
Log-likelihood  –91.0     –911.8     –908.3     –922.9    
LR χ
2  632.19    628.56    635.55    606.33   
P-value  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: Estimates of probit marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. DA = development agent. 
* p < .1; 
** p < .05; 
*** p < .01. 
In contrast, landholders are more, not less, likely to also receive agricultural extension services. 
Even though other farmers—for example, those who only lease in or sharecrop in land—would of course 
in principle have no less need for advisory services from DAs, this result is nevertheless not too 
surprising, as the category of nonlandholders may include not only sharecroppers but also farm laborers 
and others who will not have as immediate a need for agricultural advice as those making farming 
decisions. 
The other major focus of this study is the gender incidence of services, and the regression results 
strongly conform to the findings on benefit incidence. Controlling for several factors, including location, 
gender plays a driving role in the chances of receiving extension. Considering the range of models, being  
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male increases the probability of accessing this service by 11–15 percent, holding other factors constant. 
Older age of the respondent also increases the odds of receiving extension (and does so at a decreasing 
rate). 
There is a pronounced positive association between vertical social capital and extension access, as 
there is between the use of mass media sources and extension access. Across all specifications, 
respondents who engage with a wider range of individuals in local leadership positions are also more 
likely to have access to agricultural extension. (The measure of vertical social capital excludes contacts 
with any DA, due to the obvious fact that having extension directly entails such contacts.) In contrast, 
human capital does not seem to play a role in the chances of receiving agricultural advice, controlling for 
the range of other factors. 
The findings on the analysis of correlates of access to improved drinking water have some 
notable similarities to the corresponding analysis of agricultural extension. First, the supply-side factor is 
equally (and again, unsurprisingly) determining. The greater number of water facilities in a household’s 
kebele makes it statistically significantly more likely that a household will use an improved water source 
as its primary source, although the magnitude appears modest: one additional facility in a kebele increases 
the probability of using drinking water by only 4–5 percent (Table 26). There is even stronger evidence in 
the case of water than in the case of extension that on average, less wealthy households (especially based 
on the wealth indicator of housing quality) are more likely to access improved water facilities. This 
finding is consistent with the results from the benefit incidence analysis, even as, here, locational effects 
are controlled for. 
There are also interesting parallels to the findings on extension with respect to how vertical social 
capital, human capital, and information relate to access of this public service. Again, having vertical 
social capital through a wide set of local leadership contacts is significantly positively related to the use of 
safe drinking water. Also, frequent consumption of media bears such a positive relationship. And again as 
in the case of extension, education does not seem to matter in the likelihood of safe water use ceteris 
paribus. Here we considered two measures of education: education of the head and education of the 
woman (whether head or spouse) in the household, based on the a priori hypothesis that since the woman 
typically is responsible for fetching water, it may be the level of human capital of the woman, not that of 
the (male) head, that matters. The different specifications include those considering only the education of 
head (Model 10) or only that of the woman (Model 9), to see whether high collinearity may be 
diminishing the statistical significance of results. In all specifications, however, this relationship, although 
positive, did not emerge as statistically significant. 
Other results, on the other hand, contrast with the findings on extension. Although individuals 
who made use of the key service that is complementary to agricultural extension—cooperative services—
were significantly more likely to access extension, the analogous is not true here. It can be reasonably 
argued that health extension services—which provide information on, among other things, the health 
effects of hygiene and the household use of clean water—are complementary to the provision of a safe 
drinking water supply. 
The models in Table 26 consider access to the household in general, and access specifically by 
the woman in the household, since, as mentioned in various placed above, women tend to be responsible 
for fetching water. Models 7 and 8 consider these two measures of access to complementary services 
separately, given that they will be strongly related to each other. Across all specifications, however, it is 
not the case that access to health extension workers is positively and statistically significantly related to 
greater probability of reliance on improved drinking water sources. This could of course be a placement 
effect; that is, health extension workers may attend specifically to households with poorer health 
outcomes or health and hygiene practices. This analysis examines correlates of access to services; further 
research—and perhaps fruitfully with a single focus on one sector and one or very few hypotheses—
should seek to flesh out how key factors affect access and use of a service. 
Finally—and consistent with the results from the benefit incidence analysis—after controlling for 
the factors discussed above, as well as for additional household characteristics and location, there remains 
a strong gender effect, in that members of FHHs are more likely to fetch water from an improved source  
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than are members of MHHs. Section 8 had offered some thoughts on the possible reasons behind this 
relationship. Given that this is indeed an interesting finding, with important policy implications if the 
reasons proposed earlier are true, it may be useful to further hone in on this matter in future research to 
more rigorously explore how the gender of decisionmakers and investment in clean water are related. 
Table 26. Access to improved drinking water 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
Supply-side factors                     
Number of water 
facilities in kebele  .0432
*** (.0087)  .0490
*** (.0070)  .0403
***  (.0086)  .0433
***  (.0088)  .0403
*** (.0086) 
Demand-side factors                   
Household access to complementary services                     
Health extension for 
household  –.0385 (.0540)  –.0408 (.0510)  –.0369  (.0539)  –.0298  (.0544)  –.0287 (.0543) 
Number of children and 
women  –.0084 (.0191)  –.0063 (.0186)  –.0085  (.0190)  –.0111  (.0188)  –.0120 (.0187) 
Household wealth                            
Assets  –.0003 (.0004)  –.0006 (.0004)  –.0002  (.0004)  –.0003  (.0004)  –.0003 (.0004) 
Land  .0280 (.0745)  .0621 (.0544)  .0262  (.0724)  .0339  (.0746)  .0270 (.0725) 
Improved housing  –.1479
*** (.0418)  –.0249 (.0407)  –.1473
***  (.0418)  –.1470
***  (.0420)  -.1452
*** (.0420) 
Human capital, vertical social capital, and information                
Number of high social 
contacts (excl. WC)  .0295
*** (.0099)  .0048 (.0088)  .0298
***  (.0099)  .0268
***  (.0098)  .0272
*** (.0098) 
Access to media  .0795
* (.0419)  .0676
* (.0409)  .0740
*  (.0416)  .0992
**  (.0415)  .0945
** (.0412) 
Education of head  .0104 (.0074)  .0121
* (.0072)  .0105  (.0074)  .0081  (.0074)  .0080 (.0074) 
Education of woman  .0045 (.0119)  .0002 (.0112)  .0062  (.0117)  .0038  (.0118)  .0061 (.0116) 
Other household characteristics                       
Household demographics                         
Gender of head  –.1329
*** (.0514)  –.0812 (.0493)  –.1290
**  (.0512)  –.1270
**  (.0510)  –.1226
** (.0508) 
Age of head  .0008 (.0075)  .0007 (.0074)  .0010  (.0075)  .0020  (.0075)  .0024 (.0075) 
Age-sq.  .0000 (.0001)  .0000 (.0001)  .0000  (.0001)  .0000  (.0001)  –.0000 (.0001) 
Household size  .0152 (.0166)  .0140 (.0161)  .0160  (.0165)  .0163  (.0164)  .0176 (.0163) 
Social group affiliation (ethnicity and religion)                   
Oromo  –.0197 (.0926)  –.1588
*** (.0447)        –.0376  (.0911)       
Tigraian  .2936
** (.1404)  –.0068 (.0614)        .2937
**  (.1398)       
Anuak  .0938 (.3103)  .2621
*** (.0684)        .0337  (.2951)       
Protestant  –.0380 (.0673)  –.0347 (.0633)  –.0458  (.0666)           
Orthodox  .0262 (.0669)  .0850 (.0637)  .0320  (.0666)           
Muslim  .2860
** (.1122)  .2064
** (.0826)  .2833
**  (.1121)           
Location effects                           
Bati  –.1897
* (.1122)      –.2075
**  (.0829)  .0373  (.1291)  –.0167 (.0796) 
Gog  .0664 (.2982)      .1468  (.0928)  .0879  (.3017)  .0968 (.0766) 
Ibantu  –.2929
*** (.0704)      –.3158
***  (.0464)  –.3034
***  (.0648)  -.3380
*** (.0371) 
Ofla  –.2761
*** (.0666)      –.1098
*  (.0634)  –.2661
***  (.0717)  –.0891 (.0658) 
Sheko  –.2900
*** (.0484)      –.3033
***  (.0448)  –.2704
***  (.0485)  -.2911
*** (.0434) 
Telalak  –.2015
** (.0935)      –.2212
**  (.0862)  .0203  (.1033)  –.0244 (.0955) 
Yaso  .1624 (.1089)      .1289  (.1042)  .1398  (.0995)  .0920 (.0931) 
Number of observations  938    938    938    938    938   
pseudo-R
2  .2018     .1484     .1978     .1936     .189    
Log-likelihood  –488.4     –521.1     –49.9     –493.5     –496.2    
LR χ
2  246.99    181.63    242.08    236.92    231.50   
P-value  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    
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Table 26. Continued 
  (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  
Supply-side factors                     
Number of water 
facilities in kebele  .0432
*** (.0087)  .0455
*** (.0087)  .0432
*** (.0087)  .0428
*** (.0087)  .0420
***  (.0085) 
Demand-side factors                         
Household  access to complementary assets and services                   
Health extension for 
household  –.0330 (.0545)  –.0194 (.0550)      –.0362 (.0542)  –.0427  (.0529) 
Health extension for 
woman in household              .0161 (.0586)           
Number of children and 
women  –.0089 (.0190)  –.0105 (.0190)  –.0088 (.0190)  –.0085 (.0190)  –.0090  (.0188) 
Household wealth                            
Assets        –.0002 (.0004)  –.0003 (.0004)  –.0003 (.0004)  –.0002  (.0004) 
Assets per capita  –.0028 (.0021)                     
Land  .0326 (.0741)  .0471 (.0726)  .0284 (.0745)  .0264 (.0751)  .0347  (.0722) 
Improved housing  –.1488
*** (.0417)  –.1269
*** (.0422)  –.1475
*** (.0418)  –.1517
*** (.0415)  –.1497
***  (.0408) 
Human capital, vertical social capital, and information                
Number of high social 
contacts (excl. WC)  .0292
*** (.0099)        .0285
*** (.0098)  .0313
*** (.0098)  .0301
***  (.0098) 
Social leadership        .0226 (.0435)               
Access to media  .0803
* (.0418)  .0976
** (.0417)  .0823
** (.0418)  .0917
** (.0411)  .0839
**  (.0414) 
Education of head  .0103 (.0074)  .0130
* (.0074)  .0102 (.0074)      .0094  (.0066) 
Education of woman  .0050 (.0119)  .0010 (.0118)  .0045 (.0119)  .0116 (.0107)       
Other household characteristics                       
Household demographics                           
Gender of head  –.1314
** (.0514)  –.1168
** (.0509)  –.1473
*** (.0514)  –.1205
** (.0504)  –.1292
**  (.0502) 
Age of head  .0012 (.0075)  .0026 (.0075)  .0004 (.0075)  .0003 (.0075)  –.0013  (.0072) 
Age-sq.  .0000 (.0001)  –.0000 (.0001)  .0000 (.0001)  .0000 (.0001)  .0000  (.0001) 
Household size  .0108 (.0167)  .0154 (.0166)  .0150 (.0165)  .0156 (.0166)  .0161  (.0164) 
Social group affiliation (ethnicity and religion)                   
Oromo  –.0227 (.0922)  –.0453 (.0908)  –.0216 (.0925)  –.0241 (.0924)  –.0218  (.0920) 
Tigraian  .3023
** (.1399)  .2936
** (.1408)  .2914
** (.1408)  .2981
** (.1405)  .2392
*  (.1371) 
Anuak  .0716 (.3073)  .0422 (.3002)  .0874 (.3094)  .1143 (.3113)  .0406  (.2948) 
Protestant  –.0380 (.0672)  –.0336 (.0671)  –.0384 (.0673)  –.0339 (.0674)  –.0531  (.0658) 
Orthodox  .0261 (.0669)  .0210 (.0665)  .0255 (.0668)  .0235 (.0667)  .0201  (.0658) 
Muslim  .2855
** (.1125)  .2678
** (.1130)  .2795
** (.1125)  .2751
** (.1120)  .2664
**  (.1111) 
Location effects                           
Bati  –.1783 (.1160)  –.1751 (.1181)  –.1702 (.1185)  –.1798 (.1156)  –.1812  (.1133) 
Gog  .0966 (.3055)  .1646 (.3095)  .1018 (.3037)  .0514 (.2931)  .1292  (.3025) 
Ibantu  –.2786
*** (.0754)  –.2849
*** (.0741)  –.2775
*** (.0758)  –.2828
*** (.0741)  –.2883
***  (.0703) 
Ofla  –.2800
*** (.0649)  –.2832
*** (.0653)  –.2767
*** (.0664)  –.274
*** (.0680)  –.2482
***  (.0728) 
Sheko  –.2755
*** (.0520)  –.2451
*** (.0567)  –.2761
*** (.0516)  –.2908
*** (.0485)  –.2933
***  (.0465) 
Telalak  –.1794
* (.1011)  –.1650 (.1052)  –.1808
* (.0999)  –.2014
** (.0939)  –.1980
**  (.0929) 
Yaso  .1943
* (.1106)  .1272 (.1075)  .1966
* (.1083)  .1772 (.1085)  .1643  (.1071) 
Number of observations  938    938    938    938    962   
pseudo-R
2  .2030     .1947     .2015     .2002     .2005    
Log-likelihood  –487.7     –492.8     –488.6     –489.4     –501.0    
LR χ
2  248.44    238.35    246.58    245.02    251.23   
p-value  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: Estimates of probit marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. WC = water committee. 
* p < .1; 
** p < .05; 
*** p < .01.  
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Tables 27 and 28 display the results relating to the beneficiary status of selected components of 
the FSP. Table 27 considers the correlates of benefitting from the components combined, and Table 28 
considers separately the two major components, access to DS and to PW transfers. In the latter, we 
examine how results may vary when accounting for the full sample, versus only the households in the 
food-insecure weredas (as was done in the benefit incidence analysis in the concentration curves of 
Figure 6). 
In the case of standard public services—such as agricultural extension and water—there is an 
apparent supply-side factor to consider that may affect service use, but service use is still contingent upon 
individuals or households having the requisite complementary assets, services, or characteristics that 
would make use of the service feasible or attractive. In the case of a program such as the FSP, which is 
highly targeted and where uptake among households targeted/eligible for transfers is in nearly all cases 
attractive from the households’ perspective, there is no apparent supply-side factor to be considered. 
Thus, the models in Tables 27 and 28 focus on demand-side factors and other household characteristics. 
We first consider the key variables of interest in the benefit incidence analysis in Section 7 above: 
gender of the head and household wealth. In the regression analyses, controlling for other variables, FHHs 
have a greater probability of being included in the program than do MHHs. This overall result seems to be 
driven by the way the gender of the head is related to inclusion in the direct support program, where this 
relationship is statistically significant; the same is not true for the chances of receiving PW transfers. 
These results mirror those in the incidence analysis in Section 7. A further result that emerges robustly 
from Table 28 on the FSP is the strong positive relationship between endowment with vertical social 
capital and access to the program. Holding other factors constant, greater household size is also associated 
with greater probability of accessing FSP transfers. 
In the models of the probability of being included in the FSP as a whole (for the selected 
components examined in this study), there is a consistent negative relationship between household 
physical assets and probability of inclusion. This pertains to household assets as captured in the incidence 
analysis; in contrast, however, having landholdings tends to be associated with a higher probability of 
accessing FSP transfers. These results mirror those on the correlates of access to extension, where asset-
poorer, but landed, households tended to have higher chances of receiving agricultural advisory services. 
The results on the factors associated with public works and with direct support benefits provide tentative 
evidence that greater household wealth goes hand in hand with reduced chances of being included in the 
PW component. No such evidence can be discerned with respect to inclusion in the DS component. 
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Table 27. Participation in selected components of the Food Security Program combined 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
Demand-side factors                            
Factors related to eligibility                         
Number of working-age HH 
members  –.0306  (.0255)  –.0394  (.0250)  –.0323  (.0251)  –.0390  (.0247)  –.0334  (.0254)  –.0264  (.0254) 
Household wealth                            
Assets  –.0015
**  (.0007)  –.0011
*  (.0006)  –.0015
**  (.0007)  –.0008  (.0006)      –.0015
**  (.0006) 
Assets per capita                      –.0051
*  (.0029)      
Land  .1575
**  (.0790)  .0912  (.0586)  .1623
**  (.0782)  .0827  (.0564)  .1514
*  (.0789)  .1695
**  (.0786) 
Higher-quality housing  –.0427  (.0807)  –.0513  (.0793)  –.0495  (.0785)  .0014  (.0734)  –.0348  (.0807)  .0391  (.0766) 
Human capital, vertical social capital, and information               
Number of high social contacts  .0435
***  (.0153)  .0477
***  (.0150)  .0440
***  (.0151)  .0424
***  (.0146)  .0430
***  (.0153)      
HH in social leadership                          –.0079  (.0692) 
Access to media  .0683  (.0585)  .0529  (.0579)  .0504  (.0577)  .0547  (.0571)  .0625  (.0583)  .1123
*  (.0574) 
Education of head  .0007  (.0110)  –.0009  (.0107)  .0019  (.0109)  –.0012  (.0106)  .0009  (.0109)  .0045  (.0108) 
Other household characteristics                         
Household demographics                         
Gender of head  –.1310
**  (.0550)  –.1361
**  (.0540)  –.1251
**  (.0548)  –.1373
**  (.0536)  –.1318
**  (.0551)  –.0990
*  (.0545) 
Age of head  .0007  (.0088)  –.0004  (.0088)  –.0005  (.0087)  –.0011  (.0087)  .0010  (.0088)  .0045  (.0086) 
Age of head-sq.  .0000  (.0001)  .0000  (.0001)  .0000  (.0001)  .0000  (.0001)  .0000  (.0001)  –.0000  (.0001) 
Household size  .0363
**  (.0146)  .0419
***  (.0143)  .0365
**  (.0146)  .0437
***  (.0141)  .0279
*  (.0152)  .0347
**  (.0146) 
Social group affiliation (ethnicity and religion)                    
Oromo  .2736
**  (.1273)      .1001  (.0679)      .2716
**  (.1272)  .2765
**  (.1271) 
Tigraian  –.0132  (.0623)      –.0105  (.0620)      –.0125  (.0621)  –.0187  (.0620) 
Afar  .3644
***  (.1373)      .1833
*  (.0993)      .3418
**  (.1392)  .4105
***  (.1297) 
Orthodox  .9888  (2.5820)  .9724  (6.5540)            .9889  (2.5787)  .9929  (1.7296) 
Muslim  .9754  (5.1068)  .9766  (5.5887)            .9755  (5.0807)  .9811  (4.0446) 
Number of observations  543     543     547     547     543     543    
pseudo-R
2  .054     .045     .047     .040     .051     .043   
Log-likelihood  –355.46    –358.78     –36.75     –363.63     –356.38     –359.57    
LR χ
2  40.50    33.86    35.83    30.08    38.65    32.28   
p-value  0.0007    0.0013    0.0011    0.0015    0.0012    0.0092   
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the EEPRI/IFPRI survey. 
Note: Estimates of probit marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Wereda effects not included, sample design results in no variation in number of sample households 
that are beneficiaries. HH = household; FSP = Food Security Program.  
* p < .1; 
** p < .05; 
*** p < .01.  
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Table 28. Participation in direct support and public works components of the Food Security Program 
  Direct support    Public works 
  (1)    (2)    (3)      (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)   
Demand-side factors                                  
Factors related to eligibility                               
Number of working-age 
household members  –.0310  (.0497) –.0078
* (.0042)  –.0334
**  (.0166)    .0084  (.0207)  –.0003  (.0012)  .0055  (.0193)  .0103  (.0187) 
Household wealth                                    
Assets  .0000  (.0003)  –.0001 (.0001)  –.0000  (.0003)    –.0056  (.0056)  –.0005  (.0003)  –.0056  (.0075)  –.0058
***  (.0010) 
Land  .0439  (.0841)  .0101 (.0086)  .0700  (.0486)    .0616  (.0823)  .0034  (.0039)  .0493  (.0852)  .0695  (.0521) 
Higher-quality housing  .1275  (.1733)  .0236 (.0156)  .1209
*  (.0729)    –.1204  (.1459)  –.0069  (.0056)  –.1193  (.1962)  –.1312
***  (.0349) 
Human capital, vertical social capital, and information                       
Number of high social contacts  .0131  (.0222)  .0012 (.0019)  .0141  (.0101)    .0385  (.0391)  .0011  (.0010)  .0347  (.0479)  .0396
***  (.0113) 
Access to media  .0248  (.0558)  .0064 (.0090)  .0204  (.0418)    .0747  (.0824)  .0045  (.0045)  .0595  (.0875)  .0559  (.0460) 
Education of head  –.0024  (.0087)  –.0003 (.0016)  .0001  (.0081)    .0005  (.0073)  –.0002  (.0005)  .0003  (.0068)  .0020  (.0072) 
Other household characteristics                                
Household demographics                                 
Gender of head  –.1276  (.1738) –.0313
* (.0162)  –.1310
***  (.0436)    –.0516  (.0667)  .0016  (.0026)  –.0416  (.0693)  –.0445  (.0457) 
Age of head  –.0048  (.0091)  –.0001 (.0011)  –.0043  (.0055)    .0123  (.0139)  .0013  (.0010)  .0117  (.0171)  .0104  (.0068) 
Age of head-sq.  .0001  (.0001)  .0000 (.0000)  .0001  (.0001)    –.0001  (.0002)  –.0000  (.0000)  –.0001  (.0002)  –.0001
*  (.0001) 
Household size  .0081  (.0153)  .0008 (.0019)  .0067  (.0093)    .0236  (.0255)  .0010  (.0010)  .0234  (.0331)  .0226
**  (.0110) 
Social group affiliation (ethnicity and religion)                         
Oromo  –.0205  (.0832)  .0032 (.0126)          .4579
*  (.2672)  .0388  (.0258)        .1128  (.1695) 
Tigraian  .0915  (.1378)  .0496
* (.0275)          –.0079  (.0407)  .0074  (.0070)        .0458  (.1041) 
Afar  .4941  (.3975)  .370
*** (.1326)          –.1686  (.2019)  –.0084  (.0071)        –.2403
***  (.0461) 
Protestant  –.1188
***  (.0295) –.0338
* (.0186)          .8469
***  (.0310)  –.0075  (.0079)  .8639
***  (.0323)     
Orthodox  –.9934 (2.3312)  .0135 (.0260)          .99998
***  (.0102)  .1656
**  (.0695)  .999998
***  (.0431)     
Muslim  –.9969 (1.2712)  .0246 (.0383)          .9997
***  (.1268)  .2581
**  (.1297)  .9997
***  (.1534)     
Location effects                                   
Bati          –.0059  (.0568)            .7539
***  (.2574)  .1112  (.1739) 
Ofla          .1127
*  (.0625)            .0049  (.0390)  –.0487  (.0870) 
Telalak          .5656
***  (.1175)                   
Number of observations  547     1,105     547       547     1,105     547     547   
pseudo-R
2  .2571     .3923     .2615       .2753     .3937     .2839     .2567   
Log-likelihood  –193.3     –205.3     –192.1       –249.0     –293.7     –246.1     –255.4   
LR χ
2  133.78    265.12    136.09      189.21    381.53    195.09    176.42   
p-value  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000      0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Estimates of probit marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Telalak is not included in public works models, as no sample households received PW transfers. 
* p < .1; 
** p < .05; 
*** p < .01.  
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10.  SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This study examined the benefit incidence of public spending on, and access to, three important services 
and programs in Ethiopia: agricultural extension, drinking water supply, and the FSP. Broadly speaking, 
we examined the wealth incidence of agricultural extension services in four different ways. One is 
through concentration curves, which are similar to Lorenz curves in that they provide a visual illustration 
of the extent of equity in an indicator, but distinct from Lorenz curves in several important ways that 
make them suitable for examining the wealth or income incidence of public services. The analysis of the 
two main modes of extension access, as well as of all types of extension access taken together, suggests 
that the provision of agricultural extension services is relatively progressive: lower-wealth individuals 
receive agricultural extension services at a greater rate than better-endowed individuals. The 
concentration curves also show that there are differences in progressivity of different types of extension 
services, with advice provided through community meetings somewhat less progressive than advice 
through home visits by DAs. 
A second type of analysis, the more discretized (that is, by quintile) analysis of the incidence of 
public investments in agricultural extension, reveals additional elements of incidence that do not emerge 
in the continuous analysis that concentration curves constitute. Overall incidence may be progressive, but 
there are departures from this conclusion when considering the behavior of incidence at the two ends of 
the wealth spectrum, specifically, through the BP ratios of the spending incidence shares of each quintile. 
Public spending benefit incidence actually increases from the poorest to the second poorest quintile, and 
again increases markedly—specifically, doubles—from the second highest to the highest quintile. In other 
words, the incidences for the least well endowed and for the highest endowed farmers cause the cross-
quintile incidence to depart from depicting a consistently pro-poor trend. 
A third analysis considers the correlates of agricultural extension, based on a framework of 
demand- and supply-side factors that may bear on the quality, quantity, and equity of public services. The 
regression analysis shows that once a range of factors, including location effects, are controlled for there 
is no statistically significant positive or negative correlation of wealth with access to extension services. 
However, when location effects are not controlled for, the negative relationship that is implied by the 
concentration curves, and that is partially implied by the public spending incidence analysis, reemerges. 
This suggests that the placement of extension services across different localities may be driving the 
wealth incidence, rather than features of how the poor and nonpoor access extension within a given 
locality. 
A final type of analysis compares the average with the marginal incidence of agricultural 
extension. Whereas the former considers how on average different wealth groups benefit from the supply 
of the service, the latter estimates the differential incidence across wealth groups of an additional 
expansion of the service. We find that the largest benefits from a service expansion would accrue to the 
poorest individuals. However, the marginal benefits to the poorest are somewhat lower than their average 
benefits, while the marginal benefits of the third and fourth quintile are greater than their incidence on 
average. Thus, while service expansion would still come to the benefit of the less well off, the poor 
benefit less from this expansion than they do from supply on average. 
The benefit incidence for selected components of the FSP has similarly been analyzed using 
various, but related, methods. Overall, the average incidence of participation in the program is pro-poor. 
Whether we consider the results from the quantile-based public spending incidence or the distributive 
features shown in the concentration curves, incidence is higher for households with lower endowments 
and vice versa. Unlike what was found in the case of agricultural extension, here this is true with regard to 
the whole wealth spectrum. The regression analysis of factors associated with access to the overall 
program conveys a relationship between wealth and access that is consistent with the incidence analysis 
(however, this only holds for wealth as measured in physical assets; land appears to be positively 
associated with access to the program). 
We also consider the incidence of the two major components of the program reaching study 
households—namely, the food/cash-for-work program, referred to also as public works (PW), and the free 
food and/or cash aid to households, referred to as direct support (DS). Although the incidence of  
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participation in the public works component is pronouncedly progressive, no clear progressivity is 
discerned in the incidence of the DS component. In the analysis across all study weredas, although the 
poorest quintile has the highest incidence and the wealthiest quintile has the lowest, there is no 
decreasing-incidence trend across all quintiles. The concentration curve for participation in the DS 
component similarly offers a mixed picture. 
In addition to examining the incidence of participation, this study also considered how the value 
of cash plus in-kind receipts from the program’s transfers have reached the poorer and the less poor 
households. In analysis considering both beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries (for whom receipts are 
naturally zero), the pattern of incidence of monetized benefits is quite similar to the incidence of 
participation in the program; overall, the incidence is progressive, with pronounced progressivity of PW 
transfers and nonprogressivity of DS transfers. In an alternative incidence analysis of receipts only among 
beneficiaries, we find that the highest-wealth quintile receives the greatest value of transfers. The lack of 
a pro-poor distribution of benefit values is once again driven by the way that DS transfer amounts are 
distributed among households, where the latter are in fact quite regressive among beneficiaries. 
Both participation and value of transfer incidence are also examined for the subset of weredas 
that are food-insecure. The finding is consistent with a conclusion that households in those sample 
weredas that have been declared food-insecure by the program are generally lower wealth than 
households in the remaining weredas. After removing the latter, all concentration curves, whether for 
participation or receipts, depict a less progressive distribution. Finally, results from the marginal 
incidence analysis draw conclusions similar to those for agricultural extension: while the poor benefit not 
only on average but on the margin from an extension of the program, their gain from an expansion is less 
than their gain on average; in contrast, the higher quintiles’ marginal incidence is greater than their 
average incidence. 
Two main measures of access are used in assessing the benefit incidence of drinking water 
supply: physical access through proximity, which is likely to correlate with water quantity, and the extent 
of use of improved drinking water facilities, which proxies water quality. The results show that there do 
not seem to be any clear distinctions between lower- and higher-wealth households in terms of (the proxy 
for) drinking water quantity. However, there is a clear incidence trend of drinking water quality, favoring 
poorer households. We considered several variations in the measure of access to safe sources of water, 
including the use of a safe source as one’s primary source versus the exclusive use of safe water sources, 
as well as the use in dry seasons, wet seasons, and both seasons. The conclusion is broadly similar for all 
variations: poorer households use improved water sources at a greater rate than better-off households. It 
should be said, however, that in the case of the more comprehensive measure of exclusive use of safe 
water, the incidence is less progressive, and the incidence of the highest-wealth quintile violates the 
overall trend. Also, in contrast to the marginal incidence findings for the other two programs, in the case 
of water services there is no distinct departure of marginal incidence from average incidence trends. 
This study also examined the gender incidence of public sectors in the three programs of focus. 
For agricultural extension, it was possible to consider how men and women differentially benefited from 
the service. In the case of drinking water services, however, the gender dimension examined was the 
gender of the head of the household. From the supply side, water services are not delivered separately to 
men or women in the household; from the demand side, it is not the case that either men or women in the 
household consume (or do not consume) water from improved drinking sources. This does not mean that 
the quantity of water consumption is necessarily identical between a head and spouse in the household—
as it is known to not necessarily be for food consumption, as several intrahousehold food consumption 
studies have shown. However, since the study did not consider the physical quantity of water consumed 
but rather assessed access to safe water infrastructure, it was deemed appropriate in this case to assess 
gender incidence by the gender of the household head. The same approach was used with respect to the 
FSP, since the program targets households for eligibility as beneficiaries rather than assessing eligibility 
and noneligibility of specific individuals within the household. 
As was expected, our findings showed a substantial gender gap in access to extension. The 
female-to-male ratio of access to extension is approximately 0.53, suggesting that women receive 
extension services at about half the rate as men. This is capturing two dynamics—both a gender element  
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and a head-status element—as women are less likely to be household heads than men. The gender 
element can be isolated when, for example, looking at the gender gap of only household heads, which is 
0.7. The “headship gap” just among women is also 0.69. The BP ratio of the public spending incidence of 
agricultural extension with respect to gender shows a similar picture: the BP odds ratio, which would be 1 
for both men and women under perfectly equitable incidence, is 0.73 for women and 1.31 for men. This 
finding can be interpreted as showing that men receive 31 percent more of the benefits from public 
investments in agricultural extension than they would under perfect gender equity. 
The overall gender incidence of the examined components of the FSP offers a more gender-
equitable picture—though, as discussed above, it should be reemphasized that comparison across 
programs can be only tentative given the different dimensions of gender considered in extension versus 
the other two programs. The BP odds ratio of public spending on the components of the FSP under study 
is 0.95 for FHHs and 1.02 for MHHs. This finding suggests indeed practically equitable incidence. 
However, this overall result is the outcome of opposite incidence trends in the two main components 
studied: The BP odds ratio for FHHs and MHHs in the PW component favors the latter, at 0.64 and 1.14, 
respectively. In contrast, the ratios for the DS component are 2.77 and 0.29, respectively, an incidence 
strongly in favor of FHHs. Analysis of the magnitude of receipts from the program conveys a similar 
picture. 
Interesting and not necessarily expected findings emerge from the gender incidence analysis for 
drinking water supply. FHHs travel longer distances to their main water source, but they select safe water 
sources at a greater rate than do MHHs. The latter (reverse from the common) gender gap in safe water 
access is quite pronounced in the case of use of safe sources as the primary source, and less pronounced 
but still present in the case of exclusive use of improved water sources. These results seem to partially be 
the “gender-mirror image” of the wealth incidence of water access, and the symmetry appears to simply 
be the consequence of FHH’s also being poorer. The regression analysis suggests that one is not merely 
an outcome of the other; there is both a strong gender and a wealth effect (with improved housing being 
the wealth indicator) that is consistent with the incidence analysis. 
In addition to the importance of these three types of public services in the Ethiopian context, as 
discussed in the introduction to this paper, it is also of interest to view the findings on incidence of these 
programs through the prism of their different characteristics. We will discuss four such characteristics: (1) 
targeted versus nontargeted services; (2) complementary assets, services, and resources needed to be able 
to access or fruitfully use the services; (3) the private or public good character of these services; and (4) 
pathways through which access to the services affects welfare.  
First, what makes the FSP distinct in this group of services is that it is a targeted program, with 
defined eligibility criteria. The FSP’s Program Implementation Manual details which type of households 
should receive it, albeit with some built-in flexibility for local (kebele)-level determination of 
beneficiaries. Agricultural extension services and improved drinking water supply (aside from their 
provision in the context of the FSP) are not formally targeted programs, although of course household and 
community characteristics may determine placement of these services. 
Our findings on the benefit incidence of certain components of the FSP can, to some extent, be 
viewed in light of the features of their targeting. The PW component has a partial self-targeting aspect—
only those with a low enough opportunity cost will select into the program to provide unskilled manual 
labor against a modest cash or in-kind wage—in addition to the administrative targeting of eligibility 
based on certain criteria. In contrast, the DS component lacks a self-targeting feature. This raises the 
question of whether the incidence patterns observed in this study point to relatively strong self-targeting 
mechanisms and relatively weaker implementation of administrative targeting procedures. 
Having said that, it is important to highlight again that, although the key elements on the basis of 
which we conduct the benefit incidence analysis are likely to correlate with the criteria that the FSP 
administration chose for eligibility assessment, the basis for our analysis—household wealth and gender 
of household heads—is not the same as the FSP targeting criteria. Thus, the analysis should not be taken 
as a direct assessment of the effectiveness of the FSP’s targeting (an early-stage assessment of PSNP 
targeting is given in Sharp, Brown, and Teshome 2006), but rather as an examination of how households  
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of different wealth groups and gender are reached with this service, as these are important questions in 
their own right. 
As mentioned above, water services are in the category of untargeted programs. However, the 
results of the benefit incidence analysis above may point to the placement of water facilities by 
governments and NGOs closer to the poor. It is also possible that poorer households are just more prone 
to use safe water sources; however, this explanation is counterintuitive, as the poor may have less access 
to information regarding the benefits of safe water choices and also have fewer resources available to pay 
for safe water. With these two possibilities in mind, the results certainly point to the need for further 
research on the possible drivers of these incidence results. 
Second, the services differ in terms of the extent to which complementary assets, services, and 
resources on the part of the user are required to be able to access the service, or to be able to benefit from 
it if accessed. Examples include access to complementary cooperative public services, in order to be able 
to access fertilizer or improved seeds, to which agricultural extension agents’ advice would be linked. 
Complementary assets could also be private financial resources in order to be able to pay for the water use 
costs of improved facilities, or time resources that are used up especially when there is a trade-off 
between going to a nearby unimproved natural source or walking longer to reach a facility providing 
clean water. The findings in this study should be viewed in this light. For example, the public spending 
incidence of agricultural extension, while broadly pro-poor, is not so for the full-wealth spectrum. The 
“kinks” in the incidence trend should not be surprising, since the poorest of the poor may not have the 
complementary financial resources to purchase the inputs that the DA may advise them to use. The 
incidence results on water are particularly interesting and somewhat unexpected, since one may intuit that 
water fees (if required for the use of facilities) are more easily borne by better-off households. A reverse 
relationship with wealth indicators is identified also in the regression analysis, after controlling for 
location effects. 
Third, although none of the services falls into either extremes of a pure private or public good, 
they differ with regard to their locus on the private-to-public-goods spectrum. This has some implications 
for how incidence results should be judged. The household transfers of the FSP can be thought of as more 
of a private than a public good. Thus, the key argument for its public provision would be to improve 
equity—and indeed, the main goal and targeting mechanism as described in the program’s design is quite 
related to equity, namely, better equity in Ethiopian households’ food security. Agricultural extension 
services have a more local public goods character than household transfers, in that their provision may 
directly benefit more than the individual or household receiving the advisory services, through diffusion 
of knowledge among farmers. Thus, the nature of its public provision—and its immediate (that is, 
ignoring such diffusion effects) incidence—can be driven and justified by efficiency concerns, in addition 
to any possible equity goals. Finally, drinking water supply has an even more pronounced (local) public 
goods character: its provision through the construction of water facilities will directly serve a community 
of households (subject to congestion effects), where this locally nonrivalrous feature of the service does 
not rely on the assumption of diffusion. 
Finally, the pathways through which the services translate into improved welfare differ for each 
of the three services. Conceptually speaking, household food and cash transfers have direct welfare 
effects, by increasing food security and income. Agricultural extension services have indirect welfare 
effects, in that they improve agricultural productivity, which in turn improves food security and incomes. 
Access to improved water services has both indirect and direct welfare effects: The improved health 
outcomes from drinking safe water have intrinsic welfare implications, as good health can be considered 
an inherently desirable condition. But better health also increases labor productivity, which in turn has a 
positive impact on incomes. Although what is the actual impact of these public services is an empirical 
question, these conceptual effects—that is, the direct welfare effects of the FSP, indirect welfare effects of 
extension provision, and both direct and indirect welfare effects of a clean water supply—should be taken 
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